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This  paper  tests  whether  the  correlation  between  wages  and  the  spatial  concentration  of 
employment  can  be  explained  by  unobserved  worker  productivity  differences.  Residential 
location  is  used  as  a  proxy  for  a  worker’s  unobserved  productivity,  and  average  workplace 
commute time is used to test whether location-based productivity differences are compensated 
away by longer commutes. Analyses using confidential data from the 2000 Decennial Census 
Long Form find that the agglomeration estimates are robust to comparisons within residential 
location and that the estimates do not persist after controlling for commuting costs suggesting 
that the productivity differences across locations are not due to productivity differences across 
individuals. 
 




The strong correlation between wages and the concentration of economic activity has 
often been cited as evidence of agglomeration economies, but this correlation may also arise 
because highly productive workers prefer locations with high levels of economic activity. In this 
paper, a standard wage model is used to test for wage premia in agglomerated locations, except 
that a worker’s residential location is used as a proxy for his or her unobservable productivity, 
under the premise that workers sort across residential locations based in part on their permanent 
incomes  or  innate  labor  market  productivity.  Further,  in  a  locational  equilibrium,  identical 
workers  should  receive  equal  compensation,  and  therefore  similar  workers  facing  the  same 
housing prices should receive the same wage net of commuting costs. The conceptual experiment 
is to compare two observationally equivalent individuals who reside in the same location and 
work in locations with different levels of agglomeration. Does the individual that works in the 
high  agglomeration  location  earn  a  higher  wage  suggesting  higher  productivity  at  that  work 
location, and if so does he or she also have a sufficiently longer commute so that the two workers 
receive the same real wage suggesting that the workers indeed have similar innate labor market 
productivity? 
A central feature of most models of agglomeration economies is that agglomeration raises 
productivity. Since firms pay workers the value of their marginal production in competitive labor 
markets, a natural test for agglomeration economies is whether firms pay a wage premium in 
areas with concentrated economic activity.
1 Glaeser and Mare (2001), Wheeler (2001), Combes, 
                                                 
1 Studies of agglomeration use a wide variety of approaches including examining productivity (Ciccone and Hall, 
1996; Henderson, 2003), employment (Glaeser et al., 1992; Henderson, Kuncoro, and Turner, 1995), establishment 
births and relocations (Carlton, 1983; Duranton and Puga, 2001; Rosenthal and Strange, 2003), co-agglomeration of 
industries (Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr, In Press; Dumais, Ellison, and Glaeser, 2002), product innovation (Audretsch 
and Feldman, 1996; Feldman and Audretsch, 1999) and land rents (Rauch, 1993; Dekle and Eaton, 1999). Also see 
Audretsch and Feldman (2004), Duranton and Puga (2004), Moretti (2004) and Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for 
detailed surveys of the literature on agglomeration economies and production externalities within cities.   4 
 
 
Duranton, and Gobillon (2004), Rosenthal and Strange (2006), Yankow (2006), Fu (2007) and 
Di Addario and Patacchini (2008) all find that wages are higher in large labor markets with high 
concentrations of employment. Many of these studies also find a positive link between wages 
and the human capital level associated with an employment concentration.
2  
A  classic  question  in  this  literature  is  whether  productivity  is  intrinsically  higher  in 
locations with a high concentration of employment, or whether high quality workers have simply 
sorted into those areas.
3 Glaeser and Mare (2001), Wheeler (2001), Yankow (2006) and Combes, 
Duranton, and Gobillon (2008) find evidence of an urban wage premium using longitudinal data, 
but  worker  fixed  effects  do  explain  a  substantial  portion  of  the  raw  correlation  between 
employment concentration and wages. These studies often find that wages grow faster in larger 
urban areas, potentially due to faster accumulation of human capital.
4 The obvious limitation of 
this approach is that the relationship between agglomeration and wages is identified by the small 
fraction of people who move from one metropolitan area to another and those moves likely occur 
in response to attractive, potentially unexpected opportunities.
5 
Our paper proposes a new strategy that avoids relying on movers by drawing explicitly 
on several well-established features of urban economies. First, a worker’s residential location is 
used  as  a  proxy  for  his  or  her  unobservable  productivity  attributes.  Specifically,  the  paper 
                                                 
2 Other studies, Wheaton and Lewis (2002), Fu (2007) and Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2004) find evidence 
that wages increase with concentrations of employment in an individual’s own occupation or industry. 
3 Another major concern in the agglomeration literature is that individual places may have unobservables that 
contribute to higher productivity and so attract a concentration of economic activity so that high place specific 
productivity contributes to agglomeration rather than the other way around (Henderson, 2003; Ciccone and Hall, 
1996). Regardless, most wage based studies of agglomeration focus on bias from sorting of workers across 
workplaces. In the context of this second concern, our analysis might be considered a test of worker sorting versus 
place specific productivity differences defined more broadly.   
4 The most compelling evidence behind the human capital accumulation story is provided by Glaeser and Mare 
(2001) who find that workers who migrate away from large metropolitan areas retain their earnings gains. 
5 In a cross-sectional study,  Di Addario and Patacchini (2008) argue that they have identified causal effects of 
agglomeration on wages because there is almost no migration, i.e. sorting, across the labor markets covered in their 
sample of workers in Italy. The paper provides strong evidence that workers in large labor markets in Italy are more 
productive,  but  it  is  unclear  whether  this  higher  productivity  arises  from  agglomeration  economies  or  other 
unobservables, such as across market differences in the quality of the education system or attitudes towards work.   5 
 
 
estimates wage premia across work locations that are located in the same metropolitan area
6 and 
examines whether these work location wage premia are robust to the inclusion of residential 
location  fixed  effects.  This  research  design  draws  on  the  commonly  accepted  premise  that 
individuals sort over residential locations based on tastes, which are partially unobservable and 
correlated with worker productivity.
7 For example, workers with higher productivity know that 
they can expect a higher lifetime income, and therefore these workers are likely to have a greater 
willingness to pay for neighborhood amenities. Workers residing in similar quality locations 
should have similar levels of productivity, and after controlling for residential location those 
workers  should  earn  similar  wages,  unless  their  respective  employment  locations  create 
productivity differences between the workers.
8  
Further, equilibrium in an urban economy requires that equivalent workers should obtain 
the same level of utility even if they live or work in different locations. After controlling for 
commuting time differences, workers residing in the same neighborhood should be indifferent 
between  jobs  in  different  locations,  even  if  one  of  those  locations  contributes  to  higher 
productivity and therefore higher nominal wages. Rational workers will sort into locations with 
higher  wages  until  congestion  increases  commuting  time  eroding  the  real  value  of  the  high 
nominal wage. In equilibrium, wage differences across locations must be entirely compensated 
                                                 
6 Rosenthal and Strange (2006) also examine agglomeration effects on wages within metropolitan areas, but their 
primary focus is on the attenuation of these economies over space.  
7 A huge literature documents the fact that households are stratified across neighborhoods in part based on income.  
Gabriel and Rosenthal (1999) directly examine the effect of household sorting on wage models, Bayer, McMillan 
and Rueben (2004) estimate models of household sorting over neighborhoods based on race and income, and Epple 
and Sieg (1999) estimate models of household sorting over communities based on income.   
8 As will be discussed later, under specific assumptions, the residential fixed effects meet the conditions for a control 
function for our wage equation, see Blundell and Dias (2009). This strategy is also similar to an approach developed 
by Dale and Kruger (2002) in their study of higher education who condition on the set of schools to which students 
applied and were either accepted or rejected, and among students with similar choices and outcomes on this margin 




9 and unexplained location wage premia should not persist in models that 
control for both residential location and commute time unless those premia were created by 
unobserved  productivity  differences  between  workers.  Specifically,  a  zero  estimate  on  work 
location  agglomeration  in  a  model  of  wages  net  of  commuting  costs  is  consistent  with  no 
conditional correlation between agglomeration and worker unobserved productivity. While this 
compensation logic has been applied in the quality of life literature (Roback, 1982; Gyouko, 
Kahn,  and  Tracy,  1999;  Albouy,  2008,  2009)  and  in  Davis,  Fisher,  and  Whited  (2009)  and 
Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) to study wage premia across metropolitan areas, this logic has not 
been  exploited  to  examine  agglomeration  economies  within  metropolitan  areas,  even  though 
within a metropolitan area job and residential mobility rates are substantially higher than across 
metropolitan mobility (Ross, 1998).  
  We draw a sample of individuals residing in mid-sized to large metropolitan areas from 
the  confidential  data  of  the  long  form  of  the  2000  U.S.  Decennial  Census  and  estimate  the 
relationship between the concentration of employment in their workplace (employment location) 
and their wage, controlling for a standard set of individual controls plus occupation, industry, 
and metropolitan area fixed effects. We find agglomeration effects that are comparable in size to 
earlier estimates, as well as evidence that the wages are higher in locations with more educated 
workers.
10 The agglomeration estimates are unchanged by the use of residential location fixed 
effects to control for unobserved worker productivity differences, and our estimates suggest that 
a one standard deviation increase in agglomeration as measured by total employment raises log 
                                                 
9 Timothy and Wheaton (2001) examine the capitalization of commutes into wages within urban labor markets 
Some earlier studies of urban wage gradients include Madden (1985), Ihlanfeldt (1992), McMillen and Singell 
(1992) and Ihlanfeldt and Young (1994). 
10 The influence of the presence of educated workers on wages is discussed in the context of human capital 
externalities. However, this paper does not make any explicit attempt to test the various competing hypotheses 
concerning the underlying causes of agglomeration economies. See Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr (In Press) and Fu 
(2007) for recent work on this question.   7 
 
 
wages by 0.033, which is approximately half of the across metropolitan wage premium. This 
share of the cross-sectional urban wage premium is comparable to the 60 to 80 percent reduction 
found by Glaeser and Mayer (200) and the 50 percent reduction found by Combes, Duranton, 
and  Gobillon  (2008)  when  they  control  for  individual  fixed  effects.  The  robustness  of  our 
agglomeration estimates to the inclusion of residential fixed effects is consistent with the small 
estimated  within  metropolitan  area  correlation  between  agglomeration  and  our  observable 
measure of productivity, education.
11 Further, commute time can explain most of the relationship 
between the agglomeration variable and wages with very reasonable values on total commuting 
costs of less than 1.8 times the wage, suggesting that the estimated agglomeration effect is not 
due to unobserved worker productivity. Similar findings arise for human capital externalities 
using an extended model that controls for the average education level in the work location.  
The two obvious weaknesses of this approach are that residential location may provide an 
imperfect control for unobserved worker quality and that workers may sort over commute time 
based  on  their  unobservables  creating  a  correlation  between  commutes  and  worker 
productivity.
12 Concerning imperfect neighborhood controls, we extend our basic model to allow 
for sorting on factors other than permanent income. By directly calculating the bias using an 
errors-in-variables framework (see appendix), we demonstrate that the inclusion of residential 
fixed effects reduces bias in our agglomeration estimates, leads to attenuation of the estimated 
coefficients on observed human capital, and the magnitude of the bias reduction is quite sensitive 
to the attenuation of human capital estimates. Empirically, we examine the estimated coefficients 
                                                 
11 The across metropolitan area correlation between education and agglomeration is substantially larger than the 
within metropolitan correlation, suggesting a substnatial across metropolitan correlation between ability and 
agglomeration, which is consistent with the large declines in the agglomeration estimates found by Glaeser and 
Mayer (200) and Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008) from the inclusion of individual fixed effects.   
12 The systematic selection of workers across commutes based on income or wage rate is well established in urban 
economics, see LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983) and Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport (2008).    8 
 
 
on the education variables and find that the estimates are attenuated by the inclusion of the 
residential  controls,  exactly  as  is  expected  if  the  residential  controls  are  capturing  worker 
productivity unobservables. Attenuation increases substantially as residential controls are refined 
to smaller geographic units to capture more unobservables, and yet our agglomeration estimates 
are very stable suggesting little bias from worker heterogeneity in the original OLS estimates.
13 
In addition, our results are robust in models that drop all individual covariates, which should 
exacerbate bias if imperfect sorting is a serious concern.  
Concerning  the  commute  time  model,  we  directly  test  whether  workers  sort  across 
commutes  based  on  observable  measures  of  human  capital.  We  find  that  the  conditional 
correlation between average workplace commute time and worker education is between 0.019 
and 0.034, and these small correlations are associated with no appreciable attenuation of the 
human capital coefficients from the inclusion of commute time as a control. After controlling for 
other model variables, workers are not sorting across commutes based on observable measures of 
human capital, which is supportive of the maintained assumption that workers are not sorting 
over  commutes  based  on  unobservable  ability.
14  Further,  using  the  errors-in-variable 
calculations, we demonstrate that the small agglomeration estimates in the net of commute wage 
model provide an upper bound for the bias in the fixed effect estimates, as long as the estimate 
                                                 
13 One might reasonably ask whether this attenuation could be explained by measurement error in our education 
variables, given the common perception that measurement error is exacerbated by the inclusion of fixed effects. The 
answer is yes and no.  The attenuation bias from measurement error is only exacerbated by the inclusion of fixed 
effects when the fixed effects can systematically explain variation in the control variable, in this case our observable 
measure of productivity - education.  Therefore, one must ask why the residential fixed effects are correlated with 
observable productivity, presumably sorting, and then ask whether the fixed effects should not be also correlated 
with unobservable aspects of productivity. Therefore, while some of the attenuation in parameter estimates may be 
due to increased attenuation from measurement error in education, this attenuation likely can only arise due to a 
correlation between residential location and productivity variables and so supports our claim that the increased 
attenuation is evidence that our fixed effects provide a proxy for productivity in wage regressions.       
14 Altonji, Elder, and Tabor (2005) suggest that the degree of selection on observables may provide a good 
indication of the potential selection on and bias from unobservables. Further, given the anticipated strong correlation 
between education and ability, sorting over commutes based on ability would likely show up as a correlation 
between commutes and education.   9 
 
 
on commute time is at or below the true value. Our model estimates provide substantial evidence 
of agglomeration economies for quite conservative values of commuting costs.  
In summary, we apply our identification strategy to a large, representative sample and 
estimate the relationship between concentrated employment and wages using a broad population 
of workers residing in mid-sized and large U.S. metropolitan areas. Even after conditioning on 
residential  location,  we  find  estimates  of  agglomeration  economies  that  are  comparable  in 
magnitude to traditional estimates. Further, the empirical relationship between agglomeration 
and net of commute wages is far too small to explain our agglomeration estimates suggesting 
again  that  they  are  not  seriously  biased  by  unobserved  worker  productivity.    Therefore,  we 
conclude that location specific wage premia associated with agglomeration within metropolitan 
areas cannot be explained by worker heterogeneity. 
  The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our empirical methodology 
and summarizes our errors-in-variables analysis.
15 The third and fourth sections describe the data 
and the findings, and the fifth section concludes. 
Methodology 
The  basic  empirical  model  is  quite  similar  to  models  investigated  in  previous  wage 
studies of agglomeration economies where it is assumed that firms pay workers their marginal 
revenue product and so differences in nominal wages capture the returns to higher productivity 
arising in agglomerated locations. The logarithm of individual i’s wage (yij) in location j is  
  ij i j i ij Z X y e a g b + + + = ,                (1) 
where Xi is a vector of individual observable attributes, Zj is employment concentration in the 
employment location j, ai is an individual specific random effect that captures heterogeneity in 
                                                 
15 See appendix for the complete errors-in-variables analysis.   10 
 
 
labor market productivity, but is uncorrelated with Xi, and eij is a random error that allows an 
individual’s current earnings or wage to differ from their permanent income or earnings capacity, 
possibly due to the idiosyncratic match between workers and jobs.
16 If individuals sort over 
employment locations based on their expected wage or inherent productivity (βXi+ai), or tastes 
that  are  correlated  with  productivity,  the  unobserved  component  of  productivity  ai  will  be 
correlated with Zj or 
  [ ] 0 j i E Z a ¹ ,  
biasing  estimates  of  g.  Typically,  the  concern  is  that  high  ability  individuals  sort  into  high 
agglomeration locations biasing the estimates of agglomeration effects on wages upwards.  For 
example, see Gabriel and Rosenthal (1999), Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2004) and Epple and 
Sieg  (1999)  for  evidence  of  individuals  and  households  systematically  sorting  across 
neighborhoods and communities based on wages or income. 
Residential Location as a Proxy for Worker Unobservables 
Our proposed solution to this problem is based on the simple idea that individuals sort 
into  residential  locations  based  on  their  unobservables,  and  therefore  one  can  minimize 
unobservable differences between workers by comparing individuals who reside in the same 
location. Specifically, under assumptions specified below, the residential location fixed effects 
will act as a control function for worker productivity. Specifically, Blundell and Dias (2009) 
formally define a control function δ as  d a e | ) , ( ) , ( i j i ij X Z ^  based on notation in equation (1) 
                                                 
16 The assumption that Xi and ai are uncorrelated can be made without loss of generality by considering β as 
representing the reduced form relationship between observables and wages. Specifically, let κi be the true 
unobserved productivity that correlates with Xi and assume that the conditional expectation of κi can be written as a 
linear function λXi. Under those conditions, the expectation of equation (1) may be written as follows 
i i i i i i i i i i i j ij X X E X E X X X Z y E a l b k k k b k b g + + = - + + = + = - ) ( ]) | [ ( ] | [ ] | [  yielding a reduced form model 
specification where  ] | [ i i X E k represents that biasl and ai is orthogonal to Xi by construction because  i k in the 
last term has been differenced by its conditional expectation.   11 
 
 
so that conditional on δ OLS will yield consistent estimates of g. The properties of residential 
sorting models with taste unobservables have been well established by Epple and Platt (1998), 
Epple and Sieg (1999), and Bayer and Ross (2006). Specifically, these models imply perfect 
stratification so that if individuals sort across residential locations based solely on a common 
measure of location quality (Wk) and their demand for location quality, then each residential 
location k will contain workers in a continuous interval of location quality demand.  
If  we  assume  demand  depends  on  permanent  income  based  on  a  worker’s  innate 
productivity  (βXi+ai), worker productivity will be monotonic in location quality, or in other 
words locations can be ordered so that if 
  1 + < k k W W   
for location k then in equilibrium 
1 + < + < k i i k X d a b d  
for all individuals i residing in location k where δk is assumed to be less than δk+1 for any k. If  
there are a large number of residential choices then  
  i i k X a b d + »                    (2) 
Figure  1  illustrates  this  partial  equilibrium  sorting  pattern  where  a  band  of  individuals  with 
similar  permanent  income  i i X a b + reside  in  the  same  community  and  these  groups  are 
monotonically ordered by permanent income over K communities of increasing attractiveness. 
The  slanted  lines  represent  loci  of  boundary  individuals  who  all  have  the  same  permanent 
income and are indifferent between the neighborhoods on either side of a locus.  
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Under these assumptions, dk satisfies the definition of a control function, and consistent 
estimates of g can be obtained by substituting equation (2) into equation (1) and estimating the 
following equation 
  ijk j k ijk Z y e g d + + = ,                  (3) 
where dk might be captured by a vector of residential location fixed effects. In this specification, 
workers  in  the  same  residential  location  are  assumed  to  have  identical  productivity,  and  so 
unexplained wage differences across workers in the same residential location must reflect aspects 
productivity associated with the work location, such as agglomeration economies or some innate 
aspect of productivity associated with agglomerated locations, rather than worker unobservables.   
A Test for the Correlation between Worker Unobservables and Agglomeration 
  The second component of our strategy for testing whether the estimated value of g is 
biased by unobserved differences in worker productivity draws upon the locational equilibrium 
requirement that no workers desire to change either their residential or employment locations. As 
discussed earlier, observationally equivalent workers residing in the same location should earn 
the  same  wages  net  of  commute  or  the  same  real  wage  unless  some  workers  have  higher 
            Figure 1. Sorting Equilibrium                                   
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productivity  based  on  unobservables.  Under  the  assumption  that  the  urban  economy  is  in  a 
locational equilibrium, we attribute any systematic differences in wages net of commuting costs 
to  the  sorting  of  individuals  across  work  locations  based  on  individual  productivity 
unobservables. A finding of no systematic relationship between real wages and agglomeration in 
a  model  that  controls  for  commuting  costs  is  consistent  with  a  zero  correlation  between 
unobserved differences in worker productivity and agglomeration, and therefore consistent with 
unbiased estimates of agglomeration economies in the model of nominal wages. 
  Formally, locational equilibrium requires that 
) , , ( ) , , ( ' ' k j k j jk k j V P y U V P y U =               (4) 
where U is the indirect utility function of a type of individuals who reside in location k and are 
observed in both employment locations j and  ' j , Pk is the price per unit of housing services in 
location k, and Vjk is the commuting time or cost between locations k and j. Fujita and Ogawa 
(1982)  and  Ogawa  and  Fujita  (1980)  consider  a  simple  model  of  the  urban  economy  with 
production externalities (agglomeration economies) and commuting where work hours and land 
consumption are fixed. In this model, the equilibrium condition in equation (4) requires that 
wages net of commuting costs must be the same across all employment locations j conditional on 
a worker’s residential location. Specifically, 
  ) , ( ) , ( ' ' k k j j k jk j P V y U P V y U h h - = -  or  k j j jk j V y V y ' ' h h - = -     (5) 
over all work locations j and  ' j  where η is the per mile or minute commuting costs.
17 The reader 
should note that wages net of commute costs or real wages in this context are constant across 
                                                 
17 See Ross (1996) and Ross and Yinger (1995) for examples of the same locational equilibrium condition in a 
traditional monocentric urban model with an exogenous city center. In those papers, housing demand is endogenous, 
and the locational equilibrium condition in equation (5) still arises. In fact, this equation will hold and commute time 
is monetized in any model where either leisure does not enter preferences or total work hours including commute 
time are fixed.    14 
 
 
work  locations  even  though  agglomeration  economies  exist  as  reflected  by  nominal  wage 
differences across work locations.  
Building on the logic of this model, we will specify wage equations in which wages 
compensate workers for commute costs in a work location, as opposed to wages being based on 
worker’s marginal product in a location.
18 Given the sorting described in equation (2), workers in 
the same residential location have the same innate productivity or permanent income and so 
should receive the same real wages. Wages for individuals residing in residential location k and 
working in location j can be written as  
ijk jk k ijk t y x h d + + = ,                 (6) 
where tjk is the commute time, η captures the monetary value of all commuting costs including 
time spent communing, and  ijk x is a stochastic error term. This model captures compensation of 
workers as opposed to the productivity of workers as modeled in equation (3), and  ijk x  represents 
unobservable factors that affect the utility associated with individual i in work location j, again 
potentially arising from the idiosyncratic match between a worker and job, but in this case in 
terms of how attractive the worker finds the job. A comparison of equations (3) and (6) implies 
that 
) ( ijk ijk jk j t Z e x h g - + = .                (7) 
Equation (7) suggests that the influence of agglomeration on wages should be completely 
captured by commuting time. If agglomeration has no influence on wages after controlling for 
commuting  costs,  workers  in  the  same  residential  location  are  receiving  equivalent 
                                                 
18 Gabriel and Rosenthal (1996) and Petitte and Ross (1999) apply similar logic to empirically study the welfare 
impacts of residential segregation by testing whether African-Americans had longer commutes after including 
residential location fixed effects, and in the case of Petitte and Ross (1999) also including employment location 
fixed effects, as controls for housing price and wage differentials that might compensate for longer commutes.   15 
 
 
compensation,  which  could  only  occur  in  a  locational  equilibrium  if  those  workers  have 
equivalent productivity. On the other hand, if agglomeration explains wages net of commuting 
costs, those wage differentials (presuming they persist in equilibrium) must represent individual 
workers being compensated for their innate ability, which  would suggest that agglomeration 
estimates continue to be biased by worker sorting on unobservables even after controlling for 
residential location fixed effects.  
Admittedly, commute time and agglomeration will be highly correlated in equilibrium, 
and so workers by sorting into high agglomeration locations should also have sorted into work 
locations that require long commutes. So, the inclusion of commute time in the wage model may 
erode the coefficient on agglomeration even if the agglomeration coefficient is driven by workers 
sorting on unobserved ability. It is important to stress, however, that the test is not whether the 
addition  of  commute  time  as  a  control  eliminates  the  agglomeration  coefficient,  but  rather 
whether an effect of agglomeration on wages exists after conditioning on commuting costs at a 
reasonable valuation. While we will estimate models with both commute time and agglomeration 
controls in order to observe an estimated value of commuting costs,
19 the key test is whether the 
agglomeration coefficient is near zero when the commute time coefficient takes on a reasonable 
value for representing commuting costs, which can be assessed by setting the commute time 
coefficient to specific values based on outside information.  
Imperfect Neighborhood Sorting 
  The assumption of complete sorting based on permanent income or innate ability 
implies that the residential location fixed effects fully capture individual productivity. Such a 
strong assumption seems unrealistic since residential location choice is influenced by tastes that 
                                                 
19 An analysis of bias from errors in variables, located in the appendix, demonstrates that this model will provide an 
unbiased estimate of commuting costs under the assumption that our agglomeration proxy contains measurement 
error.    16 
 
 
are unlikely to be perfectly correlated with permanent income, and in practice observed human 
capital variables, like education, have strong predictive power in our wage equations even after 
controlling for residential location fixed effects. The predictive power of human capital variables 
rejects the implications of equation (3).  
Therefore, the empirical model is extended to consider the situation where the residential 
location fixed effect δk differs from the productivity of an individual residing in k by a random 
error (mi) that is uncorrelated with bXi+ai or 
  i i i k X m a b d + + = .                  (10) 
For example, mi may represent individual tastes for neighborhood quality that are independent of 
productivity  or  permanent  income.  This  heterogeneity  leads  to  a  classic  errors-in-variables 
problem. This result is easily observed by substituting equation (10) into equation (1) yielding 
) ( i ij j k ijk Z y m e g d - + + = ,                (11) 
where δk is positively correlated with mi by construction. The reader should note that mi represents 
tastes and only enters the wage equation because the fixed effect contains mi.   
  The negative correlation between the fixed effect dk and the error (εij -mi) will attenuate 
the  estimates  of  dk  towards  zero.  Given  the  assumption  that  Zj  is  positively  correlated  with 
worker ability (bXi+ai), the estimate of g continues to be biased upwards since worker ability is 
imbedded  in  the  fixed  effect  and  the  associated  correlation  between  Zj  and  dk  biases  the 
coefficient on Zj upwards. Intuitively, the attenuated fixed effect estimates provide only a partial 
control for bXi+ai, and potentially the estimates might be improved by directly including Xi in 
the location fixed effect model specification  
) ( i ij j k i ijk Z X y m e g d b - + + + = .              (12)   17 
 
 
  Further,  given  that  ai  is  unobserved,  the  estimate  of  β,  the  coefficient  vector  for 
observable human capital, conditional on residential fixed effects will be attenuated relative to 
the OLS estimates from equation (1). As illustrated in Figure 1, two individuals with different 
Xi’s residing in the same neighborhood or community are likely to have different a’s; otherwise, 
they would have had different permanent incomes and chosen different neighborhoods. This 
selection process into neighborhoods creates a negative correlation between Xi and ai within any 
residential  location  (Gabriel  and  Rosenthal,  1999;  Bayer  and  Ross,  2006)  attenuating  the 
estimated  coefficients  on  the  human  capital  variables.  In  our  case,  however,  this  bias  is  an 
advantage  because  the  predicted  attenuation  bias  in  the  human  capital  coefficient  estimates 
provides a metric for assessing whether the residential location fixed effects successfully capture 
variation  associated  with  individual  unobserved  productivity.  Specifically,  the  estimated 
coefficients on human capital variables in the residential fixed effects model can be compared to 
the estimates from a simple regression model without fixed effects, and if the inclusion of fixed 
effects reduces the estimated coefficients then the residential fixed effects have captured some 
variation associated with unobserved productivity attributes.
20 
The problem described above involves bias arising from errors-in-variables with multiple 
correlated regressors. Given the complexity of this problem, we turn to numeric calculations of 
the bias in estimated parameters in order to confirm the intuition discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs.  Specifically,  we  manually  calculate  the  formulas  for  the  omitted  bias  in  each 
parameter, use our data to estimate the variances and covariances for key observables, and then 
calculate the bias in our key parameters. The details of this analysis are shown in the appendix. 
                                                 
20 Measurement error in the education variables will also cause attenuation bias, which might be exacerbated by the 
inclusion of residential fixed effects, but the measurement error bias is only worsened by the fixed effects if the 
residential fixed effects can explain productivity attributes.  See the discussion in Footnote 13.   18 
 
 
These  calculations  confirm  the  key  assertions  earlier  in  the  section.  The  inclusion  of 
residential fixed effects into a model that controls for observable productivity or human capital 
leads to a substantial reduction in the bias in the agglomeration estimates, and the inclusion of 
commute  time  dramatically  reduces  the  estimates  on  the  agglomeration  variable.  Further,  if 
households do not sort across commutes based on their permanent income, the coefficient on the 
agglomeration variable after controlling for both residential location fixed effects and commutes 
is larger than the bias on the agglomeration estimates after controlling for residential location 
fixed  effects  and  so  provides  an  upper  bound  on  the  bias  from  imperfect  sorting.  We  also 
confirm that the coefficient estimate on human capital attenuates with the inclusion of residential 
fixed effects due to unobserved worker productivity. Further, sensitivity analyses confirm that 
the reduction in bias is quite stable over parameter values except when the attenuation of the 
human capital estimate changes, which has large impacts on the reduction in bias. 
The simulations also confirm our concerns that any correlation between productivity and 
commute time will bias our analysis. Specifically, the estimated coefficient on agglomeration in 
a model that controls for commute time may no longer provide an upper bound for the bias in the 
residential fixed effect agglomeration model. However, these calculations also indicate that the 
agglomeration coefficient after conditioning on commute time does provide an upper bound as 
long as the estimate on commute time is equal or below the parameter’s true value. This result 
confirms our earlier intuition that zero estimates on agglomeration after controlling for actual 
commute costs suggests no bias from unobserved worker productivity variables in the residential 
fixed effect agglomeration estimates.    19 
 
 
Sample and Data 
The models in this paper are estimated using the confidential data from the Long Form of 
the  2000  U.S.  Decennial  Census.  The  sample  provides  detailed  geographic  information  on 
individual residential and work location. A subsample of prime-age (30-59 years of age), full 
time  (usual  hours  worked  per  week  35  or  greater),  male  workers  is  drawn  for  the  49 
Consolidated  Metropolitan  and  Metropolitan  Statistical  Areas  that  have  one  million  or  more 
residents.
21 These restrictions lead to a sample of 2,234,092 workers. 
The dependent variable, logarithm of wage rate, is based on a wage that is calculated by 
dividing an individual’s 1999 labor market earnings by the product of number of weeks worked 
in 1999 and usual number of hours worked per week in 1999. The wage rate model includes a 
standard  set  of  labor  market  controls  including  variables  capturing  age,  race/ethnicity, 
educational attainment, marital status, presence of children in household, immigration status, as 
well as industry, occupation,
22 and metropolitan area fixed effects. Finally, the model includes 
controls for share of college-educated employees in a worker’s industry or occupation at the 
metropolitan level.
23 The mean and standard errors for these variables are shown in Table 1 
separately for the college educated and non-college educated subsamples.  
We  consider  two  alternative  specifications  to  capture  employment  concentration:  the 
number of workers employed in a employment location, which we will refer to in this paper as 
                                                 
21 This sample is comparable to the sample drawn from the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 2000 
Census by Rosenthal and Strange (2006) except that we explicitly restrict ourselves to considering residents of mid-
sized and large metropolitan areas. 
22 Workers are classified into 20 major occupation codes and 15 major industry codes. 
23 These controls are similar in spirit to a control used by Glaeser and Mare (2001) for occupation education levels 
nationally. Obviously, the industry, occupation, and metropolitan area fixed effects even when combined with the 
metropolitan area industry and occupation education controls do not absorb as much variation as the MSA-
occupation cell fixed effects used by Rosenthal and Strange (2006). Given our focus on models that control for the 
large number of residential tract fixed effects, it is not feasible to simultaneously include this large array of MSA-
occupation fixed effects. However, the models without residential fixed effects have been re-estimated with MSA-
occupation fixed effects and results were similar. Further, models including MSA-occupation fixed effects were 
estimated for some subsamples based on a small number of very large MSA’s, where residential fixed effects could 
be included directly in the model rather than differenced. Again, all findings are robust.   20 
 
 
the workplace, and the workplace employment density for a variety of workplace definitions.
24 
Similarly,  models  are  estimated  controlling  for  residential  location  at  a  variety  of  levels  of 
aggregation. Our preferred specification defines residential locations at the census tract level and 
workplaces  at  the  residential  Public  Use  Microdata  Area  (PUMA)  level,  where  residential 
PUMAs  are  defined  based  on  having  a  minimum  of  100,000  residents,  and  measures 
agglomeration using workplace employment density. The control for commute time is based on 
the average commute time
25 for all full time workers employed at a workplace.
26 Additional 
specifications are estimated that control for the fraction of workers in the workplace PUMA who 
have a college degree or above. All standard errors are clustered by workplace. 
Results  
Table 2 presents the results for a baseline model of agglomeration economies in wages 
using both controls for total employment and employment density at the residential PUMA level. 
The estimates on the control variables are quite standard and stable across the two specifications. 
Based on these estimates, adding 10,000 workers to a workplace is associated with a 0.54 percent 
                                                 
24 The agglomeration variables are constructed using all full time workers not just the prime-age, male workers 
present in the regression sample. 
25 In principle, the model should include a control for the commute of the marginal worker, but such information is 
not typically available. Timothy and Wheaton (2001) and Small (1992) describe the circumstances under which 
average commute time will be a sufficient statistic for marginal commute time, and Small (1992) provides empirical 
and simulation evidence suggesting that average commutes are a good proxy for marginal commutes. 
26 Since the models are identified based on within residential location variation, the workplace commute time 
implicitly controls for commute time between place of residence and place of work without the measurement error 
inherent in estimating average commute time between every residence to workplace combination. In principle, the 
appropriate way to handle such measurement error is to instrument for residence to workplace commute time with 
average workplace commute time, rather than simply including workplace commutes directly in the wage model. 
The IV estimates controlling for residence to workplace commute time are very similar in magnitude (slightly 
smaller) to the estimates presented here and discussed in this paper, and obviously the estimated coefficients on the 
agglomeration variables are unaffected by such a specification change.   21 
 
 
increase in wages while an increase in employment density of 1000 workers per square kilometer 
is associated with a 0.24 percent increase in wages.
27 
Fixed Effect Estimates 
Panel 1 of Table 3 contains the estimates for the baseline model, as well as the models 
that  include  residential  location  fixed  effects  at  the  census  tract  level  and  that  include  both 
residential fixed effects and average commute time at the workplace. In the residential location 
fixed effect model, the positive relationship between agglomeration and wages is robust to the 
inclusion of these controls, which should increase the similarity of individuals over which the 
effect of agglomeration economies is identified. In fact, including residential fixed effects has 
little impact on the estimated coefficients on agglomeration. The failure to find substantial bias 
from  workers  sorting  on  unobservables  across  work  locations  within  metropolitan  areas  is 
consistent  with  the  evidence  of  sorting  on  observable  human  capital  variables.  The  within 
metropolitan  area  correlation  between  worker  education  level  and  employment  density  after 
controlling  for  other  observables  is  quite  small:  0.034  for  our  education  index,
28 0.029  for 
whether a worker has at least a four year college degree, and 0.019 for whether a worker has at 
least a high school degree or above. 
Of course, one explanation for not finding evidence of sorting bias is that our residential 
location  fixed  effects  do  not  successfully  capture  worker  unobserved  productivity  variables. 
However, as discussed earlier, if the residential location fixed effects provide effective controls 
for individual productivity unobservables due to residential sorting, the coefficient estimates on 
                                                 
27 Rosenthal and Strange (2006) estimate models using the Public Use Microdata Sample and controlling for total 
employment within spatial rings of employment estimated from workplace PUMA’s. Our estimated magnitudes 
using total employment in actual workplace PUMA’s are comparable to theirs.  
28 This index was created for the correlation estimates used for our errors-in-variables bias calculations presented in 
Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix, and the index is a linear combination of the educational attainment dummies 
based on the coefficient estimates on education presented in Table 3.   22 
 
 
human  capital  should  be  biased  towards  zero  by  the  inclusion  of  residential  location  fixed 
effects. We find such evidence of attenuation bias for both models. In the density model, the 
inclusion of residential fixed effects reduces the estimates on above master’s degree, master’s 
degree, four year college degree, associate degree, and high school diploma from 0.665, 0.546, 
0.424, 0.225, and 0.138 to 0.511, 0.424, 0.330, 0.175, and 0.108, respectively, a reduction of 
between 22 and 23 percent in all coefficients.
29  
The magnitude of the within metropolitan area estimates of agglomeration economies are 
quite reasonable. The within metropolitan estimates are comparable in magnitude to simple OLS 
estimates arising from comparisons across metropolitan areas.
30 Specifically, we find that in a 
model  controlling  for  standard  individual  attributes,  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in 
metropolitan wide employment or employment density increases logarithm of wages by 0.062 
and 0.044, respectively. Meanwhile, using the census tract fixed effects estimates, a one standard 
deviation in workplace total employment or density leads to an increase in the logarithm of 
wages of 0.033 and 0.034, which is between half and three-quarters of the traditionally estimated 
across metropolitan wage premium.  
In  addition,  in  panel  2  of  Table  3,  we  examine  a  wage  model  that  controls  for  the 
logarithm of the  agglomeration variables converting the estimated effects to elasticities. The 
pattern of estimates in panel 2 is nearly identical to the pattern for the baseline estimates shown 
in panel 1 of Table 3, and the estimates imply that a doubling of agglomeration economies based 
on  total  employment  or  density  is  associated  with  a  4.3  and  2.0  percent  increase  in  wages, 
                                                 
29 Attenuation of estimates in the total employment model is virtually identical to attenuation in the employment 
density model. 
30 We estimate the same wage model controlling for metropolitan total employment or the metropolitan wide 
employment density, as well as regional fixed effects.   23 
 
 
respectively, which bracket Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon’s (2001) elasticity estimate of 3 
percent after controlling for individual fixed effects in a sample of movers.
31 
Further, in panel 3, we examine the effect of increasing the bias from unobserved ability 
by restricting the number of individual controls. Specifically, we re-estimate the models in panel 
1 dropping all individual covariates including the education, age and family structure variables, 
which  correlate  very  strongly  with  labor  market  outcomes.  Naturally,  the  R-squares  of  the 
estimated models fall substantially from 0.29 to 0.20 in the OLS model with the omission of 
these  measures  of  human  capital.  However,  the  within  metropolitan  area  OLS  estimates  of 
agglomeration economies are essentially unchanged at 0.054 and 0.0022 for total employment 
and employment density. The residential location fixed effects estimates increase somewhat from 
0.051 to 0.058 for total employment and from 0.0026 to 0.0029 for employment density, which 
are relatively small increases given the omission of so much information relevant to labor market 
outcomes. These very stable estimates of agglomeration, when so much observable information 
has been excluded, is consistent with our finding that within metropolitan area agglomeration 
estimates are not substantially biased by workers sorting based on their unobservables.
32  
In addition, in panels 4 and 5, we examine the effect of basing our estimates on more 
homogenous comparisons. First, the sample is restricted to single, male workers. This population 
of workers is less likely to have their residential location decision influenced by marital and 
family obligations. The pattern of estimates is very similar. For example, both the OLS and 
residential fixed effects employment density estimates are 0.0018.
33 In panel 5, we organize the 
                                                 
31 All other estimates in the paper involve employment and density levels rather than logs in order to be comparable 
to other recent work that uses the Census microdata to study wages and agglomeration economies. 
32 We also experimented with models that do not contain the industry and occupation fixed effects and the pattern 
and magnitude of estimates was again very similar. 
33 It is worth noting that the decline in estimated agglomeration effects for the sample of single, male workers is not 
driven by marital status. Rather, single male workers are younger and have less education on average than married 
males, and our estimated agglomeration effect increases moderately with an individual’s level of human capital. In   24 
 
 
sample into cells of observationally equivalent individuals based on discrete variables for age, 
race/  ethnicity,  education,  family  structure,  and  immigration  status,
34 and  control  for  cell  by 
census  tract  fixed  effects  so  that  our  estimates  are  truly  based  on  comparing  very  similar 
individuals who reside in the same location. As in panel 4, agglomeration estimates are not 
affected by the inclusion of residential location controls.  
Commute Time or Compensation Models 
Columns  three  and  six  of  Table  3  contain  the  estimates  for  the  model  containing 
residential  location  fixed  effects  and  workplace  average  commute  time.  The  inclusion  of 
commute  time  as  a  control  eliminates  most  of  the  relationship  between  the  agglomeration 
variables and wages, and the magnitude of the estimated coefficients fall by more than a factor of 
five in our baseline model, the estimated employment density coefficient falls from 0.0026 to 
0.0004 (panel 1), and in the logarithm model our estimated effect falls from 2.0 percent to 0.5 
percent (panel 2). The estimates fall by a factor of 10 in the model with no covariates (panel 3), 
in the sample of single men the estimate changes sign and becomes insignificant (panel 4), and 
when controlling for cell by tract fixed effects the estimates again fall by almost a factor of 10. 
The estimated agglomeration effects are almost completely compensated by longer commutes.  
Next, the key question to ask is whether the commute time control is truly capturing 
compensation of identical productivity individuals for wage differentials across workplaces or 
whether  commute  time  is  acting  as  a  proxy  for  unobserved  productivity  due  to  workers 
systematically sorting across commutes and/or workplaces. First, we can examine the extent of 
worker sorting based on observable measures of productivity. After conditioning on residential 
                                                                                                                                                             
addition, we estimated models for single and married workers separately by education level finding similar results 
that agglomeration economies increase with education levels for both single and married males. 
34 Households are divided by three age, five race, six education, four family structure based on presence of children 
by marital status, and three immigration categories based on whether born in the U.S. and time in the U.S. if not 
allowing for a total of 1,080 possible cells.   25 
 
 
location  fixed  effects  and  other  model  variables,  the  correlation  between  commute  time  and 
worker education level is 0.019 for whether the worker has a high school degree, 0.029 for 
whether the worker has a college degree or years of education, and 0.034 for the education based 
wage  index.
35 As  suggested  by  Altonji,  Elder,  and  Tabor  (2005)  in  the  context  of  Catholic 
schools, the conditional correlation between a variable of interest and observable measures of 
ability likely provides some indication of the conditional correlation between that variable and 
unobserved ability, and in our data we find a fairly small conditional correlation between average 
workplace commutes and education, our observable measure of human capital.  
Most importantly, we examine whether the estimates on commute time are consistent 
with anticipated time, monetary, and any other disutility costs of commuting. If commute time 
were  proxying  for  unobserved  productivity  variables  rather  than  compensating  for  wage 
differentials,  the  coefficient  estimate  on  commute  time  would  likely  exceed  reasonable 
commuting  costs  in  order  to  capture  high  unobserved  worker  productivity  in  agglomeration 
locations. However, if the estimate on commute time is reasonable, the agglomeration estimates 
in the commute time model captures the portion of agglomeration estimates that is not explained 
or compensated away by commutes and so might represent payments to workers based on their 
innate ability or other worker unobservables. In order to assess the magnitude of the commute 
time estimates, we start with a simple back of the envelope calculation using the estimates from 
panel  1  of  Table  3.  Specifically,  a  one  minute  increase  in  one  way  commute  time  leads  to 
approximately 0.7 percent increase in wages on average. With an eight hour day, a two minute 
increase in round trip commutes represents 0.42 percent increase in the length of the workday. 
Dividing  these  numbers  implies  that  a  0.7  percent  point  estimate  is  consistent  with  total 
                                                 
35 Workplace commute time and the education variables are regressed on the PUMA fixed effects model in Table 4 
except that the education dummy variables and the agglomeration variables are excluded from the model.    26 
 
 
commuting cost including the value of time spent and monetary costs being compensated at 1.64 
times the market wage.  
For more precise estimates, we shift to an instrumental variables framework in which we 
control for an individual’s time spent commuting as a share of average daily work time including 
commuting time (two way commute time divided by the sum of commute time and one-fifth of 
average hours worked per week assuming a five day work week) and use the average commute 
time for the workplace PUMA as an instrument.
36 This specification uses the same source of 
variation  to  identify  the  compensation  of  commutes,  but  uses  the  share  of  work  time  spent 
commuting in order to scale the effect and estimate compensation as a fraction of the wage rate. 
For example, if commuting increases the work day by one percent, the wages for time spent at 
work would need to increase by one percent in order to just compensate the worker at their wage 
for the time spent commuting.  
The  estimates  for  the  total  employment  and  employment  density  models  in  the  first 
column of Table 4 are 1.78 and 1.82 suggesting that time spent commuting is compensated at 
less than double the wage rate, which is consistent with Timothy and Wheaton (2001) who find 
compensation rates of between 1.6 and 3.0 times the wage rate.
37 Further, Small (1992) estimates 
that on average the monetary cost of commuting is both proportional to and similar in magnitude 
to an individual’s wage suggesting a compensation rate of two if people also value their time 
spent  commuting  at  the  wage  rate  and  suggesting  an  even  larger  compensation  rate  if  we 
recognize that monetary commuting costs are paid with after tax income. Finally, the next two 
columns present estimates that restrict the coefficient on commute time share to 1.5 and 1.0, 
                                                 
36 The first stage includes all control variables in the log wage equation except for the agglomeration variable so that 
the entire effect of agglomeration is captured directly by the estimated coefficient on the agglomeration variable. 
Note that models in which the agglomeration variable is included in the first stage yield nearly identical results. 
37 Another factor to consider in evaluating these commute time costs is that commuting costs are typically paid using 
after tax income and our wage measures based on the census data are pre-tax.   27 
 
 
respectively. The estimates on the agglomeration variables rise and are a little more than half the 
size of the Table 3 estimates when the commute time share coefficient is restricted to 1.0. These 
conservative estimates suggest that at least half of the estimated agglomeration economies cannot 
be  compensated  away  and  so  cannot  be  due  to  unobserved  productivity  differences  across 
individuals.
38 
Alternative Workplace and Residential Location Definitions 
  Table  5  presents  estimates  using  two  additional  workplace  definitions  to  measure 
employment density and commute time. As discussed above, the residential PUMA is defined  
to contain approximately 100,000 residents. The largest alternative definition is the workplace 
Public  Use  Microdata  Areas  (workplace  PUMAs),  which  are  often  substantially  larger  than 
residential  PUMAs  especially  near  central  cities  and  publically  available,
39 but  also  quite 
idiosyncratic across metropolitan areas with some areas having almost as many workplace as 
residential PUMAs and others areas with millions of residents having only one or two workplace 
PUMAs. There are approximately 25 percent more residential PUMAs than workplace PUMAs 
in  our  sample.  We  also  examine  models  where  agglomeration  and  workplace  commute  are 
                                                 
38 We also examine models where we control for or instrument with the average commute time between workplace 
and residential PUMA’s. The estimates on commute time fall consistent with greater measurement error in the place 
to place commute time, and the agglomeration coefficients rise somewhat. The resulting IV commute time estimates 
are approximately 1.5 similar to the commute time parameter values that were used in Columns 2 and 5 of Table 4 
and our agglomeration estimates are similar to the estimates in those columns, as well. Further, when we set the 
coefficient to 1.8, which we believe is a more reasonable value of commuting costs, our model using place to place 
commute time yields the same agglomeration estimate as observed in Table 4 using the workplace specific commute 
time.  Similar results arise if we simply control for commuting time as a share of workday.  Commute time estimates 
fall consistent with substantial measurement error, but if estimate models of wage net of commute cost using actual 
commute time and a coefficient of 1.8 we get agglomeration estimates very similar to  
39 Readers can find examples of similar estimations using data available in the Public Use Microdata sample of the 
U.S. Census in earlier working paper versions of this manuscript. See University of Connecticut Working Paper 
number 2007-26.   28 
 
 
measured  at  the  zip  code,  and  our  sample  contains  about  six  times  as  many  zip  codes  as 
residential PUMAs. Residential fixed effects are included at the census tract level.
40 
The  standardized  estimates  are  the  largest  for  residential  PUMA  suggesting  that 
measurement error might be worse for larger or smaller workplace definitions, but the other 
estimates are still sizable and statistically significant. The pattern of results across columns is 
remarkably similar except for two minor differences. When workplace PUMA is used to measure 
agglomeration, the inclusion of fixed effects leads to an increase in the agglomeration estimate of 
approximately 17 percent. For both the residential PUMA and zip code models, agglomeration 
estimates are fairly stable changing by only about 8 percent with the inclusion of fixed effects. 
Further, the attenuation of the agglomeration estimate with the inclusion of commute time is 
much larger, typically a factor of 10, for the workplace PUMA definition. While these results 
might lead one to prefer workplace PUMA, we chose the more uniform residential PUMA as the 
baseline workplace definition in order to be conservative. 
Table  6  presents  estimates  based  on  alternative  geographic  definitions  of  residential 
location. The largest neighborhood definition is the residential PUMA with estimates shown in 
panel 1, followed by estimates based on the smaller zip codes in panel 2. Census tracts are even 
smaller with populations between 1,500 and 8,000 (panel 3), and block groups are smaller still 
with populations between 600 and 3,000 (panel 4). The fixed effect estimates of agglomeration, 
as well as the fixed effect plus commute time model, are nearly identical across the four panels. 
However, the attenuation in the estimates on education variables, which indicates the degree to 
which the fixed effects can capture unobserved ability, varies dramatically. The inclusion of 
residential PUMA fixed effects leads to an attenuation of 8-12 percent, while zip codes lead to 
                                                 
40 From this point forward, we only present estimates using employment density, but estimates using total 
employment are very similar.   29 
 
 
15-17 percent, census tracts to 22-23 percent, and block groups to 24-26 percent declines in 
estimated education coefficients. The fixed effects capturing more detailed spatial resolution lead 
to greater attenuation presumably capturing a more homogeneous population on productivity in 
these smaller neighborhoods, and yet produce very similar agglomeration estimates, which based 
on  our  simulations  is  consistent  with  our  finding  that  unobserved  individual  productivity 
variables do not bias within metropolitan estimates of agglomeration.
41 
Improving the Residential Location Controls 
  In this section, we consider expanded fixed effect models that might better control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. Ortalo-Mange and Rady (2006) find substantial heterogeneity among 
homeowners within neighborhoods, but considerable homogeneity  among  renters and  among 
homeowners who moved into the neighborhood at similar times. Presumably, renters and recent 
homeowners chose this neighborhood based on current prices and neighborhood amenities and 
therefore are similar, while homeowners that moved to the neighborhood in earlier years chose 
this  neighborhood  based  on  different  prices  and  amenity  levels.  Alternatively,  one  physical 
residential location might be divided into different submarkets based on the type of housing 
stock. For example, an individual who resides in a small loft in an apartment building may be 
very different from someone who selects a large single family dwelling in the same residential 
location, even if the two individuals have similar levels of observable human capital. 
In order to address these concerns, we develop residential location fixed effects by tenure 
in residence and by housing stock categories. For the tenure of residence fixed effect model, a 
full set of tract fixed effects are created for each of the following categories: renters, owners who 
                                                 
41 In principle, the greater attenuation in the education coefficients arising from the use of block groups fixed effects 
suggest that we should use block groups fixed effects for the models that follow, but we return to the use of census 
tract fixed effects for the rest of the paper in order to facilitate comparison to the earlier results.  Regardless, the 
substantive results of the paper are robust to any of the geographies considered in this section.   30 
 
 
have been residing in the neighborhood for less than one year, owners who have been residing in 
the  neighborhood  between  one  and  five  years,  and  owners  who  have  been  residing  in  the 
neighborhood  for  more  than  five  years.  For  the  housing  stock  model,  tract  fixed  effects  are 
created for each of seven housing stock categories: mobile home, multifamily 1 bedroom or less, 
multifamily 2 bedroom, multifamily 3 bedroom or more, single family 2 or less bedrooms, single 
family 3 bedrooms, and single family 4 ore more bedrooms. The results are shown in Table 7, 
and the expansion of the residential fixed effects has little impact on the estimated agglomeration 
effects. Further, as with more geographically narrow residential locations, both sets of controls 
significantly increase the attenuation of the coefficient estimates on the human capital variables, 
from between 22-23 to 26-29 percent, while not affecting the agglomeration estimates.
42 
  In  addition,  the  locational  equilibrium  test  for  agglomeration  economies  requires  the 
assumption  that  individuals  in  the  same  residential  location  face  the  same  price  per  unit  of 
housing  services.  This  assumption  may  not  be  reasonable  because  it  is  expensive  and  often 
prohibited by zoning to change the type of housing on specific parcels of land. As a result, the 
price per unit of housing services may vary considerably across different forms of housing in the 
same  neighborhood  due  to  differences  between  current  demand  and  the  historical  supply  of 
housing in this neighborhood. Our submarket fixed effects help address this concern, and the 
resulting commute time estimates and the impact of including commute time on agglomeration 
estimates are nearly identical to the results in Table 3. 
Alternative Subsamples and Robust Commute Time Estimates 
  Table 8 presents estimates for a series of regional subsamples. The first panel presents 
results for the full sample with the subsequent panels containing the estimates for metropolitan 
                                                 
42 In principle, one might wonder whether these different geographic definitions have different implications for 
different size and density metropolitan areas. However, our agglomeration estimates are very stable as we restrict 
our analysis to a smaller number of larger metropolitan areas.   31 
 
 
areas in the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West regions. The qualitative findings concerning 
the coefficient estimate on employment density in Table 3 are replicated across all four regions. 
The  estimated  impact  of  agglomeration  is  quite  stable  when  controlling  for  residential  fixed 
effects and then falls to near zero after the inclusion of a control for commute time. The raw 
coefficient estimates on employment density exhibit substantial variation across regions, but in 
part  this  is  due  to  different  urban  environments  in  each  region.  After  standardizing  the 
coefficients using the within metropolitan area standard deviation of employment density, the 
estimated agglomeration effects in the fixed effect models are closer in magnitude with values of 
0.034, 0.055, 0.027, 0.015, and 0.017 for the full sample, Northeast, Midwest, South, and West 
regions, respectively. Also, the commute time results are quite stable across the samples with 
estimates ranging from 0.0066 to 0.0069 over the four regions as compared to 0.0069 for the full 
sample, again consistent with commuting costs that are noticeably less than twice the wage.
43 
  Table 9 presents a similar set of estimates for subsamples based on college education, 
transportation  mode,  and  race/ethnicity.  Standardized  estimates  of  agglomeration  are 
substantially higher for the college educated, non-Hispanic white, and mass transit subsamples 
ranging between 0.037 and 0.053, as compared to a range of 0.022 to 0.025 for the non-college 
educated, minority, and automobile user subsamples. As in Table 8, the agglomeration estimates 
fall dramatically when commute time is included in the models, and the estimates on commute 
time  are  stable  across  the  college  educated,  non-college  educated  workers,  automobile 
commuters, and mass transit commuters with estimates ranging between 0.0064 and 0.0074. The 
only  exception  to  this  finding  is  the  white-minority  split,  where  the  estimated  relationship 
                                                 
43 The standardized estimates on total employment for each region are quite similar to the density estimates 
presented in the paper.   32 
 
 
between  commute  time  and  wages  of  0.0034  for  minorities  is  substantially  smaller  than  the 
0.0081 estimate for non-Hispanic white subsample.
44  
This  last  finding  should  not  be  surprising  considering  previous  research  concerning 
minority commutes and the spatial mismatch hypothesis. For example, Gabriel and Rosenthal 
(1996)  and  Petitte  and Ross  (1999)  both  find  racial  differences  in  commutes  that  cannot  be 
compensated for by differences in housing prices and/or wages. Our findings are consistent with 
the notion that minorities are in a locational equilibrium when compared to each other, but are 
under  compensated  for  their  commutes  when  compared  to  the  majority  population.  Barriers 
faced by minorities or other imperfections in the labor market may differentially affect minorities 
preventing them from being fully compensated for their commutes. For example, Hellerstein, 
Neumark, and McInerney (2008) find that access to African-American held jobs, rather than 
overall employment access, explains the employment outcomes of African-Americans. 
  Finally, our finding of larger agglomeration economies for college graduates is notable 
because it is  consistent  with Moretti (2009) who finds that high skill individuals have been 
migrating to more agglomerated, higher cost metropolitan areas. His evidence suggests that the 
reason behind this is a shift in the demand for labor in these areas and is not simply a stronger 
preference  for  large  city  amenities  among  the  college  educated.  Similarly,  we  find  that  the 
agglomeration  wage  premium  is  higher  for  college  educated  individuals.  The  lower 
agglomeration coefficient for minorities may reflect the lower levels of educational attainment 
among minorities, while the large estimated agglomeration effects for the mass transit sample is 
likely due to the high concentration of mass transit users in the Northeast.
45  
                                                 
44 Again, the pattern of results is nearly identical in models using total employment to measure agglomeration. 
45 Northeast residents comprise more than half of the mass-transit subsample. The authors recognize that 
transportation mode choice is clearly endogenous to labor market earnings, and these models are estimated primarily 
to examine the stability of commute time coefficients across subsamples.   33 
 
 
Workplace Human Capital Specification 
Table 10 presents estimates for models that also include a control for the workplace share 
of workers with a four year college education or higher. The extended model is still consistent 
with agglomeration economies with a coefficient estimate of 0.0022 for the fixed effects model 
with the full sample (panel 1), very similar to the estimate in Table 3, much smaller estimates 
after controlling for commute time, and an estimated coefficient on commute time of 0.0066 
consistent with reasonable commuting costs. The education level of workers in a workplace is 
also  positively  associated  with  wages,  which  is  consistent  with  the  standard  human  capital 
externalities explanation that often arises in this context (Rauch, 1993; Moretti, 2004; Rosenthal 
and Strange, 2006). As before, the estimated effect of agglomeration on wages is robust to the 
inclusion of residential fixed effects, but the estimated effects of share college educated decline 
from 0.359 to 0.151 when residential fixed effects are included.
46 These findings are consistent 
with the notion that high skill individuals sort into places with concentrations of highly educated 
workers. As with agglomeration, the coefficient on share college educated declines substantially 
(a factor of 3 in panel 1) with the inclusion of commute time as a control. Panels 2, 3 and 4 of 
Table 10 present estimates for a model with no covariates for the full sample, for the baseline 
model  using  the  subsample  of  single,  male  workers,  and  for  a  model  controlling  for 
observationally equivalent individual cells by census tract fixed effects. As in Table 3, all results 
are robust, and the general pattern of findings persists. 
 
                                                 
46 Rosenthal and Strange (2006) control separately for the number of college educated and non-college educated 
workers. They find that the number of college educated workers increases wages while the number of non-college 
educated workers reduces wages. While this result is fairly robust, the number of college and non-college workers in 
a workplace PUMA have correlations above 0.97 even after conditioning on metropolitan area or residential PUMA. 
Further, we have identified at least one specification where we observe a sign reversal so that wages fall with the 
number of college educated. When we estimate models that are directly comparable to Rosenthal and Strange 
(2006), our estimated effect sizes are fairly similar in magnitude to their estimates for a five mile radius circle.   34 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
We find that within metropolitan wage premia cannot be explained by high productivity 
workers sorting into agglomerated locations and so these wage premia must arise from location 
specific differences, either agglomeration or other location productivity differences. Specifically, 
the estimates for both total employment and employment density indicate a positive relationship 
between workplace agglomeration and firm wages, and these estimates are unchanged by the 
inclusion of residential location controls intended to absorb worker heterogeneity, even when 
residential fixed effects are included for each group of observationally equivalent individuals. 
The magnitudes of these estimates are sizable with standardized effects between one-half and 
three-quarters  of  the  estimated  across-metropolitan  wage  premium  for  the  same  sample. 
Estimates  for  the  individual  education  variables  attenuate  when  the  residential  controls  are 
included, which is consistent with the residential controls capturing unobserved heterogeneity. 
The attenuation increases substantially as location controls are refined by focusing on smaller 
geographic measures of residential location or housing submarkets within residential locations, 
and  these  changes  have  no  impact  on  the  agglomeration  estimates  consistent  with  our  main 
finding of no bias from worker sorting. This finding is also consistent with the small within 
metropolitan area correlation between agglomeration and observable human capital.  
The  inclusion  of  commute  time  dramatically  reduces  the  estimated  effect  of 
agglomeration on wages. The estimates on commute time imply commuting costs of less than 
two times the wage, which is consistent with the current literature on commuting costs, and the 
correlation between observed measures of human capital and commute time is quite small. These 
findings  suggest  that  the  observed  nominal  wage  differences  do  not  represent  differences  in 
ability across workers because the commute time variable captures commuting costs accurately   35 
 
 
and wages net of commuting costs do not vary  systematically  across  employment locations, 
presumably leaving similar workers with similar levels of well-being.  
Further,  bias  calculations  across  a  variety  of  parameter  values  indicate  that  the 
agglomeration estimates after controlling for commute time form an upper bound for the bias in 
the fixed effect agglomeration estimates, as long as estimates on commute time are not biased 
upwards. Even in the extreme case where we assume that the total commuting costs are only one 
time the wage, the implied causal effects of agglomeration are substantial, between one-quarter 
and three-eighths of the across-metropolitan wage premium. All findings including the implied 
commuting costs are robust across a wide variety of subsamples, different geographic definitions 
of workplace and residential neighborhood, use of housing submarket by neighborhood fixed 
effects, as well as a very challenging test for our estimation strategy where we omit all individual 
level covariates substantially increasing the variance attributable to unobserved worker ability.  
Finally, an extended specification is estimated that includes a variable intended to capture 
human capital externalities, share of workers with a four year college degree or above. As in the 
previous  literature,  we  find  that  wages  increase  with  the  concentration  of  college-educated 
workers. The effect of human capital externalities on wages falls by over half with the inclusion 
of fixed effects, likely because high productivity individuals are sorting across work locations 
based on education levels. However, the resulting fixed effect estimates are still sizable, and the 
inclusion of commute time substantially reduces the estimated relationship between wages and 
share college educated workers variable supporting our view that a substantial fraction of our 
fixed effect estimates represent the causal effect of human capital externalities on wages. 
The results in this paper also have more general implications concerning the nature of 
urban economies. Only limited empirical evidence on urban wage gradients exists to support the   36 
 
 
idea that urban labor markets are in a locational equilibrium. This paper provides substantially 
more direct evidence by demonstrating that wage gradients can substantially  compensate for 
nominal  wage  differences  within  metropolitan  areas.  Further,  if  agglomeration  economies 
eventually  plateau  and  possibly  decline  on  the  margin  at  very  high  concentrations  of 
employment, empirical estimates of agglomeration effects may understate the total importance of 
agglomeration in urban economies, especially in cities with relatively effective transportation 
systems, because in equilibrium workers should continue to crowd into the high employment 
concentration locations until marginal productivity declines sufficiently to assure equal wages 
net of commuting costs. 
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A Model with Imperfect Sorting and Measurement Error 
  The  complete  sorting  and  full  compensation  assumptions  developed  above  have  two 
implications that are inconsistent with the empirical data that will be used in this study. First, as 
discussed in the body of the paper, the model with complete sorting based on permanent income 
requires  that  the  residential  location  fixed  effects  fully  capture  individual  productivity.  The 
empirical model is extended to consider the situation where the residential location fixed effect 
δk differs from the productivity of an individual residing in k by a random error (mi) that is 
uncorrelated with bXi+ai or 
  i i i k X m a b d + + = .                  (A1) 
This heterogeneity leads to a classic errors-in-variables problem. This result is easily observed by 
substituting equation (A1) into equation (1) yielding 
) ( i ij j k ijk Z y m e g d - + + = ,                (A2) 
where δk is positively correlated with mi by construction. 
  The negative correlation between the fixed effects dk and the error (εij -mi) will attenuate 
the  estimates  of  dk  towards  zero.  Given  the  assumption  that  Zj  is  positively  correlated  with 
worker ability (bXi+ai), the estimate of g continues to be biased upwards since worker ability is 
imbedded  in  the  fixed  effect  and  the  associated  correlation  between  Zj  and  dk  biases  the 
coefficient on Zj upwards. Therefore, the estimates might be improved by directly including Xi in 
the location fixed effect model specification  
) ( i ij j k i ijk Z X y m e g d b - + + + = .              (A3)   42 
 
 
Again as discussed in the paper, to the extent that dk captures worker ability, Xi is also positively 
correlated with dk, and the estimate of β, the coefficient vector for observable human capital 
conditional on residential fixed effects, will be attenuated relative to the OLS estimates from 
equation (1) if dk  is a successful proxy for worker productivity unobservables. 
  The second limitation associated with these assumptions is that neither commuting costs 
nor the effect of agglomeration on productivity varies at the individual level (see equation (7)), 
and in equilibrium these two contributors to wages should be identical. Therefore, if εijk and ξijk 
are  simply  stochastic  variations  in  short-run  wages  that  are  unrelated  to  general  features  of 
residential  or  work  location,  a  model  that  contains  both  workplace  commuting  costs  and 
agglomeration should be unidentified since the two variables should be perfectly collinear (or at 
least monotonically related allowing for a non-parametric relationship between wages and these 
variables). Yet empirically, workplace average commute time and our proxies for agglomeration 
are not perfectly collinear (nor even monotonically related) within metropolitan areas. 
  One  natural  explanation  for  the  divergence  of  agglomeration  and  commuting  time  is 
measurement  error  in  either  agglomeration  or  commuting  time.  While  measurement  error  in 
reported commute time might be mitigated by averaging many commute time reports for the 
same  workplace,  the  effect  of  agglomeration  must  be  captured  by  a  proxy,  such  as  total 
employment or employment density. Such proxies likely capture the productivity gains arising 
from interactions between firms and workers at those firms with considerable error since the 
ability of firms to share knowledge, labor force, and infrastructure varies with many  factors 
beyond the employment concentration. When agglomeration is captured with measurement error, 
the relationship between wages and measured agglomeration ( j Z ) takes the following form 
  ) ( j ijk j k ijk Z y gz e g d - + + = ,               (A4)   43 
 
 
where j j j Z z + Y = ,  and  the  true  level  of  agglomeration  is  Ψj  in  work  location  j,  which  is 
orthogonal to the measurement error term ζj and perfectly collinear with tjk.
47  
Given  that  equations  (6)  and  (8)  from  the  paper  both  hold  simultaneously,  one  can 
estimate the following model  
ijk j j jk k ijk j jk k ijk t Z t y x z h d x g h d + + Y + + = + + + = ) ( 0
~ ~ ~ .        (A5) 
Under these circumstances, the estimate on tjk will take on its true value since it is orthogonal to 
the error, while the estimate on agglomeration will be zero since commute time and the true 
effect of agglomeration are collinear and the agglomeration estimate must be based entirely on 
the orthogonal measurement error term.
48  
Calculating Bias from Errors in Variables  
The problem described above involves bias arising from errors-in-variables with multiple 
correlated regressors. Given the complexity of this problem, we turn to numeric calculations of 
the bias in estimated parameters in order to confirm the intuition discussed in the preceding 
paragraphs. Specifically, we manually calculate the formulas for the omitted variable bias and 
then calculate the bias implied by assumed values of the variables’ variances and covariances 
based  on  the  observables  in  our  sample.  Our  calculations  will  be  conducted  for  four 
specifications: 
ij i j i ij Z X y e a + + + = ,                 (A6a) 
) ( i ij j k ijk Z y m e d - + + = ,                (A6b) 
                                                 
47 Similar to the discussion in footnote 13, Ψj and ζj can be assumed to be orthogonal without loss of generality by 
defining ζj as the residual arising from a linear projection of the correlated measurement error on Ψj, and equilibrium 
requires that Ψj and tjk be collinear conditional on k. 
48 As is shown in the paper, the data are consistent with measurement error in the agglomeration variable, in that the 
commute time variable captures much more of the variation associated with workplace. If the difference between 
commute time and agglomeration were associated with measurement error in commuting costs, the estimated 
coefficient on agglomeration would dominate the coefficient on commute time.   44 
 
 
) ( 0 i ij j k i ijk Z X y m e d - + + + = ,              (A6c) 
) ( 0 0 i ij jk j k i ijk t Z X y m e d - + - + + = .            (A6d) 
Equation  (A6a)  is  a  traditional  estimation  that  is  biased  by  the  omission  of  unobserved 
productivity  or  ability  variables.  Equations  (A6b-d)  incorporate  individual  productivity 
unobservables by including residential location fixed effects, but suffer from bias due to errors-
in-variables that arise because residential sorting is driven in part by factors unrelated to total 
productivity. The “true” coefficients on Xi in (A6c) and (A6d) are zero because total productivity 
is captured by dk, and the “true” coefficient on Zj in (A6d) is zero because our agglomeration 
proxy  suffers  from  measurement  error  and  in  equilibrium  commute  time  captures  the  entire 
effect of agglomeration on wages. The resulting estimates, however, will be non-zero because 
the variables are correlated with the location fixed effect, which in turn is biased due to the 
errors-in-variables term  i arising from imperfect sorting.
49 
Without loss of generality, all coefficients are initialized to 1 and the impact of a variable 
on wages is captured by the standard deviation of the variable. Again, without loss of generality, 
the correlations between Xi and αi and between (Xi+ai) and  ik are assumed to be zero. The 
models in (A6) are then viewed as reduced form in terms of the individual level regressors where 
αi is the residual of unobserved ability that is orthogonal to observed productivity, and  i is the 
residual of individual tastes that are orthogonal to total productivity.
50 For the baseline model, 
                                                 
49 In principle, the agglomeration estimate may be biased by measurement error, which potentially gives rise to the 
assumed non-monotonic relationship between agglomeration and commute costs, but our analysis focuses on the 
bias (in this potentially attenuated estimate) that might arise from the sorting of individuals based on their 
unobserved productivity. One might examine the bias from measurement error as well. However, we would be 
uncomfortable making such corrections since measurement error is only one potential explanation for not finding a 
monotonic relationship between agglomeration and commute time. 
50 See footnote 13 for a precise discussion of the assumption that Xi and αi are uncorrelated. The assumption that 
(Xi+ai) and  i are uncorrelated follows a similar logic. This second assumption, however, is only made without loss 
of generality due to the earlier assumption that individuals can be characterized by the additive sum of (Xi+ai). If 
observable and unobservable determinants of productivity have different correlations with unobserved tastes for   45 
 
 
the variances of Xi and αi are initialized to 1. The variances of Zj and tjk are set to 0.051 and 
0.084,  respectively.  These  values  were  chosen  by  comparing  the  standardized  estimates  of 
agglomeration from the wage  equation (A6c) and the commute time estimate from equation 
(A6d) relative to the standardized influence of the worker education variables on wages.
51 The 
correlation  between  Zj  and  tjk  is  set  to  0.74  based  on  the  correlation  between  workplace 
agglomeration and average workplace commute time conditional on residential location.
52 The 
correlation between Zj and (Xi + αi) is set to 0.1 in order to allow for sizable bias associated with 
high productivity individuals sorting into high agglomeration work locations. Next, the variance 
of  the  residential  location  taste  unobservable  is  set  to  3  in  order  to  match  the  observed 
attenuation  of  the  estimates  on  the  human  capital  variables  of  approximately  25%  when 
residential fixed effects are included in the model (A6c).
53 Finally, the correlation between (Xi + 
αi) and tjk is set to zero initially, and this correlation is investigated later in this appendix.  
Table A1 presents the expectation for parameter estimates or the sum of the true value 
plus the bias using standard omitted variable calculations.
54 The first panel presents the baseline 
                                                                                                                                                             
location, then Xi and ai would not enter the fixed effect in a reduced form model with the same weights as they enter 
the wage equation. 
51 Specifically, an education index is constructed using the estimated coefficients on the educational attainment 
dummy variables. The standardized coefficients on employment density in our fixed effects model (see Table 3) is 
approximately 0.225 times the standard deviation of the education index, and the standardized coefficient on 
workplace average commute time is approximately 0.290 times the education index standard deviation. These 
standardized effects are based on conditioning out other individual controls and metropolitan area fixed effects.  
52 The non-unitary correlation between agglomeration and commuting costs when combined with the initialization 
of the agglomeration coefficient to zero is consistent with measurement error in agglomeration, but not in 
commuting costs. The empirical correlation between employment density and average workplace commute time is 
also conditional on metropolitan area fixed effects and all controls other than the human capital variables. 
53 The attenuation of the coefficients for educational attainment dummy variables is between 22 and 23 percent in 
the initial model that controls for census tract fixed effects, and attenuation increases to 24-26 percent with block 
group fixed effects and to 26-29 percent with housing submarket by census tract fixed effects. 
54 The expected value of parameter estimates can be calculated using the underlying model rather than the more 
typical least squares calculations, which require a specification for the fixed effects model such as the inclusion of 
residential location dummy variables. Rather, the expected value of wages conditional on the fixed effect model is 
] , | [ ] , | [ j k ik j k j k ijk Z E Z Z y E d m d d - + =  
and the expectation of the unobservable can be expressed as a linear function of the fixed effect and an orthogonal 
regressor if expectations are assumed to be a linear function of conditioning variables   46 
 
 
expectations of estimates given the variances and correlations described above, and the following 
panels present expectations after changing one of the variance-covariance terms. The baseline 
results show that the OLS estimate in column 1 is biased above the true value of 1. The bias on 
the agglomeration variable is actually increased by replacing observable human capital measures 
with residential location fixed effects (column 2). This increase arises from the high variance 
assigned the taste unobservable, and bias is decreased between equations (A6a) and (A6b) in 
models where that variance is less than 2.0. Nonetheless, column 3 illustrates that the bias is 
reduced by the inclusion of residential fixed effects into a model that controls for observable 
productivity or human capital (A6c). The inclusion of commute time in the fourth and final 
column (A6d) dramatically reduces the estimates on the agglomeration variable. Notably, the 
coefficient on the agglomeration variable after controlling for commutes (column 4) is larger 
than  the  bias  on  the  agglomeration  estimates  after  controlling  for  residential  location  fixed 
effects and observed human capital (column 3) and so provides an upper bound on the bias from 
imperfect sorting. Finally, looking at the second row of panel 1, the attenuation in the coefficient 
estimate on human capital is about 0.25 as calibrated to be consistent with attenuation in our 
empirical  models.  This  attenuation  decreases  monotonically  with  the  variance  of  the  taste 
unobservable.  
While the magnitude of the bias changes with the variance and covariance terms, the 
basic pattern of results remains the same. Decreasing the relative contribution of agglomeration 
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where  2 a  captures the bias in the coefficient on  j Z , but this bias involves a conditional expectation, 
] | [ k j Z E d = γ0 + γ1 δk. In order to calculate the bias in terms of unconditional moments, we recognize that 
γ1=Cov[Zj, δk]/Var[δk] and (α1 + α2 γ1)= Cov[ ik, δk]/Var[δk], and then reversing the process yields an equivalent 
coefficient on Zj in a model where the other regressor is orthogonal. The resulting two equations can be solved for 
the bias, and the results are identical to the results of the least squares omitted variable calculation in the case where 
one actually observes the true fixed effect and can include it as a regressor.   47 
 
 
to wages (panel 2), increasing the contribution of unobserved ability (panel 3), or increasing the 
correlation between individual productivity (both observed and unobserved) and agglomeration 
(panel  4)  all  increase  the  bias  in  agglomeration  estimates,  but  the  bias  is  still  reduced  by 
including fixed effects in a model with human capital controls (column 3), and the agglomeration 
coefficient in the model with commute time (column 4) still provides an upper bound to the bias 
on  agglomeration  estimate  in  column  3.
55  Finally,  decreasing  the  correlation  between 
agglomeration  and  commute  time  to  zero  (panel  5),  which  must  be  positively  related  in 
equilibrium, leads to an agglomeration parameter in column 4 that is the same as the bias in 
column  3  and  so  the  column  4  estimate  still  provides  an  upper  bound  for  bias.
56 While  the 
expectation calculations are based on one observable measure of productivity, we have repeated 
these calculations with multiple measures, and the results of those calculations are very similar 
regardless of the correlations assumed between the observable productivity variables. 
The one exception to these findings arises from a correlation between productivity and 
commute time. A positive correlation between commute time and an individuals’ productivity 
decreases the expectation for the coefficient on the agglomeration variable in column four, and 
so this expectation may no longer provide an upper bound for the bias in the agglomeration 
estimate from the model in column 3. This finding is not surprising. As discussed earlier, a key 
threat to the validity of our second test for bias from unobserved ability, where we ask whether 
agglomeration effects on wages can be explained by or compensated away by commuting costs, 
is the sorting of households across commute times based on ability.  
                                                 
55 Note that we also increase the variance of the taste unobservable when we increase the variance of unobserved 
ability in panel 3 in order to recalibrate the attenuation on the human capital estimate. 
56 The zero correlation is an extreme case. Since commute time and the true productivity effect of agglomeration are 
collinear, zero correlation implies sufficient measurement error to render our agglomeration proxy meaningless, and 
so whenever the agglomeration proxy is informative, estimates from the commute time model should provide an 
upper bound on bias from sorting.    48 
 
 
Table A2 repeats the calculations of the expected value of estimates using correlations for 
productivity (both observed and unobserved) with agglomeration and commute time drawn from 
the  data.  Specifically,  we  calculate  the  correlation  between  our  education  index  and  both 
agglomeration and commute time and use those as the correlation with both the observable and 
the unobservable component of productivity. After conditioning on metropolitan area and other 
individual  observables,  the  estimate  of  the  correlation  between  our  measure  of  observable 
productivity, education level, and agglomeration is approximately 0.040, and the estimate of the 
correlation  between  observable  productivity  and  average  workplace  commute  time  is  0.060. 
Panel 1 shows the expectations based on these  estimates, and the agglomeration estimate in 
column 4 does not provide an upper bound on the bias in column 3. The correlation between 
innate productivity and commute time must fall below 0.029 for column 4 to provide an upper 
bound (panel 2). This phenomenon arises in part because of the very small assumed correlation 
between worker innate productivity and agglomeration and so the failure of column 4 is to a 
large extent associated with situations where there is little bias in the agglomeration estimates. 
Panel  3  shows  that  column  4  provides  an  upper  bound  if  that  correlation  between  innate 
productivity and agglomeration rises above 0.081. 
These calculations indicate that column 4 provides an upper bound for the bias in column 
3 when the expectation of the commute time estimate is equal to or below the true value. In the 
Table A1 calculations, the expectation of the commute time estimate is always considerably less 
than one, and column 4 provides an upper bound with substantial clearance. In panel 1 of Table 
A2, the estimate for commute time is biased upwards by 18 percent and column 4 does not 
provide an upper bound, while in panels 2 and 3 we chose the covariances so that the expected 
value for commute time is 1.0, and this assumption leads to estimates in column 4 that exactly   49 
 
 
capture the bias in the agglomeration estimates from column 3. This finding is consistent with 
the  earlier  intuition  that  agglomeration  effects  should  be  completely  compensated  for  by 
commuting costs, but that too high a coefficient estimate on commute time suggests bias because 
households sort across commutes and/or workplaces based on unobserved productivity. 
Finally, across both tables, these simulations indicate a 25 percent reduction in bias from 
the  inclusion  of  residential  fixed  effects  that  attenuate  the  human  capital  coefficients  by  25 
percent for a wide array of parameter values except for panels 3 and 4 in Table A1.  In panel 3, 
increasing the variance of unobserved ability leads to a smaller reduction in bias of 23.3 percent 
compared  to  the  panel  1  reduction  of  24.8,  but  this  change  is  primarily  associated  with  the 
change in attenuation of the human capital estimate from 25.6 to 24.4 percent because if the 
variance of the neighborhood preference parameter is reduced to 6.1 so that attenuation in the 
human capital estimate remains identical across panels the reduction in bias is 24.6, very close to 
the panel 1 value.  In panel 4, doubling the correlation between productivity and agglomeration 
decreases  the  reduction  in  bias  slightly  and  increases  the  attenuation  in  the  human  capital 
estimate. Even when the variance of the preference parameter is increased to 3.3 to exactly 
match the attenuation of the human capital estimate in panel 1, a doubling of this correlation only 
reduces the reduction in bias from 24.8 in panel 1 to 22.3 percent.  The changes in Table A2 have 
little effect on the percent reduction in bias.  In summary, the reduction is bias is substantial for a 
large range of parameter values, but quite sensitive to the amount of attenuation in the human 
capital estimate. A 1.2 percentage point reduction in the attenuation leads to a 1.3 percentage 
point decrease in the reduction in bias from including residential fixed effects. 




Table 1: Variable Names, Means, and Standard Deviations 
Variable Name  Non-College  College Graduates 
Dependent Variable 
Average hourly wage  20.103 (30.828)  35.987 (55.428) 
Workplace Controls 
Total Residential PUMA employment in 100,000’s  0.488 (0.575)  0.641 (0.759) 
PUMA Employment density in 1000’s/square KM  2.646 (11.004)  4.772 (15.306) 
Share of college educated workers in PUMA  0.358 (0.094)  0.405 (0.101) 
Average commute time to PUMA in minutes  26.573 (6.629)  28.195 (7.787) 
Metropolitan Area Controls 
Percent college educated in MSA and occupation  0.026 (0.035)  0.056 (0.045) 
Percent college educated in MSA and industry  0.033 (0.028)  0.051 (0.035) 
Individual Worker Controls 
Age of worker   42.580 (7.980)  43.024 (8.076) 
Non-Hispanic white worker  0.672 (0.470)  0.813 (0.390) 
African-American worker  0.126 (0.332)  0.058 (0.233) 
Hispanic worker  0.159 (0.365)  0.043 (0.204) 
Asian and Pacific Islander worker  0.042 (0.200)  0.084 (0.278) 
High school degree  0.346 (0.476)   
Associates degree  0.488 (0.500)   
Four year college degree    0.599 (0.490) 
Master degree    0.255 (0.436) 
Degree beyond Masters    0.146 (0.353) 
Worker single  0.285 (0.452)  0.230 (0.421) 
Presence of own children in household  0.474 (0.499)  0.502 (0.500) 
Born in the United States  0.800 (0.400)  0.826 (0.379) 
Years in residence if not born in U.S.  18.574 (10.809)  17.432 (11.669) 
Quality of spoken English  0.164 (0.370)  0.168 (0.374) 
 
Sample size  141,5176  92,7916 
Note: Means and standard deviations are for a sample of 2,343,092 observations containing all 
male full-time workers aged 30 to 59 in the metropolitan areas with populations over 1 million 
residents where full-time work is defined as worked an average of at least 35 hours per week. 




Table 2: Baseline Model of Agglomeration Economies for Logarithm of the Wage Rate 
Independent Variables  Total Employment  Density 
Total employment in 100,000’s  0.0544 (7.80)   
Employment density in 1000’s per square KM    0.0024 (8.40) 
Percent college educated in MSA and occupation  0.8762 (6.36)  0.9237 (6.56) 
Percent college educated in MSA and industry  1.7127 (10.27)  1.7520 (10.69) 
Age of worker   0.0333 (46.19)  0.0333 (45.99) 
Age of worker squared divided by 100  -0.0369 (-46.51)  -0.0369 (-46.32) 
Non-Hispanic white worker  0.1376 (28.00)  0.1368 (27.71) 
African-American worker  -0.0064 (-1.33)  -0.0059 (-1.23) 
Hispanic worker  -0.0152 (-3.04)  -0.0156 (-3.12) 
Asian and Pacific Islander worker  0.0359 (5.73)  0.0359 (5.68) 
High school degree  0.1380 (57.50)  0.1383 (57.90) 
Associates degree  0.2241 (73.75)  0.2250 (74.84) 
Four year college degree  0.4219 (111.51)  0.4244 (113.05) 
Master degree  0.5429 (104.14)  0.5463 (107.67) 
Degree beyond Masters  0.6606 (121.29)  0.6645 (125.10) 
Worker single  -0.1350 (-107.90)  -0.1346 (-107.07) 
Presence of own children in household  0.0720 (46.93)  0.0717 (45.93) 
Born in the United States  -0.0563 (-20.81)  -0.0564 (-20.75) 
Years in residence if not born in U.S.  0.0087 (59.42)  0.0087 (59.31) 
Quality of spoken English  0.0135 (4.88)  0.0135 (4.87) 
R-square  0.2905  0.2898 
Note: The dependent variable for all regressions is the logarithm of the estimated hourly wages, 
which is calculated as annual labor market earnings divided by the product of number of weeks 
worked and average hours worked per week. The key variable of interest is either the total 
number of full time workers in an individual’s workplace based on residential PUMA or the 
density of full time workers in the workplace where full-time work is defined as worked an 
average of at least 35 hours per week. The sample of 2,343,092 observations contains male full-
time workers aged 30 to 59 in the selected metropolitan areas. The models include metropolitan 
area, 15 industry, and 20 occupation fixed effects, but those estimates are suppressed. T-




Table 3: Agglomeration Wage Models without and with Location Controls 
Variables  Total Employment  Density 
OLS  Fixed Effects  Commute Time  OLS  Fixed Effects  Commute Time 
Baseline Model Specification 
Employment  0.0544 (7.80)  0.0508 (9.79)  0.0082 (2.62)       
Density        0.0024 (8.40)  0.0026 (7.98)  0.0004 (3.83) 
Commute Time      0.0067 (20.33)      0.0069 (28.51) 
R-Square  0.2905  0.3340  0.3347  0.2898  0.3338  0.3347 
Logarithm of Employment, Density, and Commute Time 
Employment  0.0516 (22.02)  0.0432 (17.78)  0.0137 (7.31)       
Density        0.0181 (11.88)  0.0202 (13.55)  0.0047 (5.65) 
Commute Time      0.1855 (16.72)      0.1972 (17.11) 
R-Square  0.2912  0.3340  0.3346  0.2902  0.3340  0.3346 
No Individual Level Covariates 
Employment  0.0544 (7.01)  0.0575 (9.33)  0.0101 (2.92)       
Density        0.0022 (8.15)  0.0029 (7.51)  0.0003(3.10) 
Commute Time      0.0075 (20.12)      0.0079 (29.43) 
R-Square  0.1997  0.2895  0.2904  0.1987  0.2892  0.2904 
Sample of Single Men 
Employment  0.0409 (7.45)  0.0368 (8.16)  0.0004 (0.14)       
Density        0.0018 (7.93)  0.0018 (7.04)  -0.0001 (-0.88) 
Commute Time      0.0062 (16.02)      0.0064 (19.85) 
R-Square  0.2427  0.3078  0.3084  0.2422  0.3076  0.3084 
Observationally Equivalent Cells 
Employment  0.0569 (8.40)  0.0533 (8.98)  0.0068 (1.81)       
Density        0.0025 (8.17)  0.0028 (7.08)  0.0003 (2.16) 
Commute Time      0.0071 (18.35)      0.0073 (20.55) 
R-Square  0.2930  0.3563  0.3570  0.2923  0.3560  0.3570 
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Note: The OLS columns in panel 1 contain the results from Table 2, the fixed effect columns contain the results for the same model 
where metropolitan fixed effects are replaced by census tract of residence fixed effects, and the commute time columns contain the 
results for the census tract fixed effect model after the inclusion of the average commute time for the individual’s workplace at the 
residential PUMA level. Panel 2 presents estimates controlling for the logarithm of total employment or employment density, as well 
as the logarithm of average commute time for the last model. Panel 3 presents estimates for a specification where all individual worker 
covariates (as listed in Table 1) are excluded, panel 4 present estimates for a sample of single men, and panel 5 presents estimates 
based on a model that controls for worker cell by census tract fixed effects. The first three and the last models use the same sample of 
2,343,092 observations, while the fourth model uses the subsample of single men with 617,144 observations. T-Statistics based on 
standard errors clustered at the workplace are shown in parentheses.  




Table 4: Agglomeration Wage Models Instrumenting for Commute Time as Share of Work Day 













Employment  0.0082 (2.62)  0.0149 (6.64)  0.0268 (8.82)       
Density        0.0004 (3.83)  0.0008 (8.13)  0.0014 (8.47) 
Commute Time  1.7766 (20.33)  1.5000  1.0000  1.8246 (28.51)  1.5000  1.0000 
R-Square  0.3347  0.3287  0.3300  0.3347  0.3287  0.3300 
Note:  The  first  and  fourth  columns  present  two-stage  least  squares  estimates  for  the  census  tract  of  residence  fixed  effect 
agglomerations models controlling for an individual’s total commute time (both ways) as a share of their entire work day (average 
hours worked per week divided by five plus the total commute time) using the average commute time for the workplace based on 
residential PUMA (the same control variable used in Table 3) as an instrument. The next two columns present estimates based on 
predicted commute time share, but restricting the coefficient on commute time share to 1.5 and 1.0, respectively. T-Statistics based on 
standard errors clustered at the workplace are shown in parentheses. The sample size is 2,343,092. 




Table 5: Employment Density Models with Alternative Workplace Definitions 
Variables  OLS  Fixed Effects  Commute Time 
Workplace PUMA 
Density  0.0063 (4.31)  0.0074 (4.66)  0.0002 (0.43) 
Standardized Density  0.0246  0.0289  0.0008 
Commute Time      0.0075 (22.81) 
R-Square  0.2892  0.3333  0.3341 
Residential PUMA 
Density  0.0024 (8.40)  0.0026 (7.98)  0.0004 (3.83) 
Standardized Density  0.0310  0.0336  0.0052 
Commute Time      0.0069 (28.51) 
R-Square  0.2898  0.3338  0.3347 
Zip Code Tabulation Area 
Density  0.0013 (4.44)  0.0012 (4.12)  0.0003 (3.65) 
Standardized Density  0.0297  0.0274  0.0069 
Commute Time      0.0077 (30.72) 
R-Square  0.2891  0.3340  0.3364 
Note: The workplace geography for each panel is used to calculate employment density in and 
average commute time to a workplace for the models presented in that panel. The estimates in 
panel 2 contain the results from Table 3 where workplace is defined based on residential Public 
Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). Panel 1 defines workplace using the larger workplace PUMAs, 
and  panel  3  using  the  five-digit  census  defined  zip  code  tabulation  areas.  Estimates  on 
employment  density  are  scaled  or  standardized  using  the  within  metropolitan  area  standard 
deviation of that variable for the specific geography. The standard deviations for employment 
density are 3.9088, 12.9226, and 22.8446 for the workplace PUMA, residential PUMA and Zip 
Code Tabulation Area, respectively. All fixed effect models (column two) include census tract of 
residence  fixed  effects.  The  models  include  the  standard  covariates  shown  in  Table  1,  and 
estimates are based on the full sample of 2,343,092 observations for panels 1 and 2 and on 
2,132,986 observations for panel 3. T-Statistics are shown in parentheses and based on standard 




Table 6: Employment Density Models with Alternative Residential Neighborhood Definitions 
Variables  OLS  Fixed Effects  Commute Time 
Residential PUMA 
Density  0.0024 (8.40)  0.0028 (8.32)  0.0003 (2.97) 
Commute Time      0.0078 (28.83) 
R-Square  0.2898  0.3036  0.3048 
Zip Code Tabulation Area 
Density    0.0027 (7.90)  0.0004 (3.68) 
Commute Time      0.0071 (28.00) 
R-Square    0.3150  0.3160 
Census Tract 
Density    0.0026 (7.98)  0.0004 (3.83) 
Commute Time      0.0069 (28.51) 
R-Square    0.3338  0.3347 
Census Block Group 
Density    0.0026(7.93)  0.0004(3.96) 
Commute Time      0.0068(28.44) 
R-Square    0.3600  0.3609 
Note: The residential neighborhood geography for each panel is used to define the residential 
location fixed effects. The estimates in panel 3 contain the results from Table 3 where fixed 
effects  are  defined  using  census  tracts.  Panel  1  defines  the  fixed  effects  using  residential 
PUMAs, panel 2 using the five-digit census defined zip code tabulation areas, and panel 4 using 
census block groups. All models define employment density and average commute time based on 
workplace at the residential PUMA level. The models include the standard covariates shown in 
Table 1, and use the full sample of 2,343,092 observations. T-Statistics are shown in parentheses 
and based on standard errors clustered at the workplace.  




Table 7: Employment Density Models with Alternative Neighborhood Fixed Effects 
Variables  OLS  Fixed Effects  Commute Time 
Census Tract Fixed Effects 
Density  0.0024 (8.40)  0.0026 (7.98)  0.0004 (3.83) 
Commute Time      0.0069 (28.51) 
R-Square  0.2898  0.3338  0.3347 
Census Tract by Tenure in Residence Fixed Effects 
Density    0.0025 (8.08)  0.0004 (4.56) 
Commute Time      0.0066 (27.47) 
R-Square    0.3701  0.3709 
Census Tract by Housing Stock Fixed Effects 
Density    0.0025 (8.27)  0.0004 (4.36) 
Commute Time      0.0066 (27.47) 
R-Square    0.3854  0.3862 
Note:  All  models  use  workplace  agglomeration  and  commute  time  at  the  residential  PUMA 
level. The models in panel 1 control for census tract fixed effects. The models in panel 2 control 
for tenure based fixed effects that include a unique fixed effect for each of four tenure categories 
in each census tract. The models in panel 3 control for housing stock fixed effects that include a 
unique  fixed  effect  for  each  housing  stock  category  in  each  census  tract.  The  four  tenure 
categories are renter, owner in residence less than one year, owner in residence between one and 
five years, and owner in residence more than five years. The seven housing stock categories are 
mobile home, multifamily 1 bedroom or less, multifamily 2 bedroom, multifamily 3 bedroom or 
more, single family 2 or less bedrooms, single family 3 bedrooms, and single family 4 or more 
bedrooms. The models include the standard covariates shown in Table 1, and T-Statistics are 
shown in parentheses  and based on standard  errors clustered  at the workplace. Sample size: 
2,343,092. 




Table 8: Employment Density Models for Different Regions of the Country 
Variables  OLS  Fixed Effects  Commute Time 
Full Sample 
Raw Density  0.0024 (8.40)  0.0026 (7.98)  0.0004 (3.83) 
Standardized Density  0.0310  0.0336  0.0052 
Commute Time      0.0069 (28.51) 
R-Square  0.2898  0.3338  0.3347 
Sample Size  2,343,092 
Northeast 
Raw Density  0.0022 (9.65)  0.0023 ( (10.18)  0.0004 (3.34) 
Standardized Density  0.0523  0.0547  0.0095 
Commute Time      0.0066 (19.4) 
R-Square  0.2923  0.3352  0.3365 
Sample Size  569,806 
Midwest 
Raw Density  0.0037 (12.64)  0.0038 (10.65)  0.0004 (0.9) 
Standardized Density  0.0258  0.0265  0.0028 
Commute Time      0.0067 (10.68) 
R-Square  0.2644  0.3079  0.3085 
Sample Size  527,781 
South 
Raw Density  0.0052 (6.4)  0.0046 (5.87)  0.0007 (1.36) 
Standardized Density  0.0167  0.0148  0.0023 
Commute Time      0.0067 (10.27) 
R-Square  0.3065  0.3485  0.3492 
Sample Size  637,023 
West 
Raw Density  0.0032 (2.58)  0.0047 (4.74)  -0.00005(-0.12) 
Standardized Density  0.0116  0.0171  -0.0002 
Commute Time      0.0069 (13.89) 
R-Square  0.2905  0.3356  0.3362 
Sample Size  608,482 
Note: All models use workplace agglomeration and commute time at the residential PUMA level 
and fixed effect models control for census tract fixed effects. The estimates in panel 1 are for the 
full sample and the estimates in panels 2-5 are for the subsample of residents residing in the 
Northeast, Midwest, South, and West census regions. The standardized density coefficients are 
based on the within metropolitan area standard deviation of the employment density variable 
measured  at  the  workplace  PUMA.  The  standard  deviations  are  12.9226,  23.7880,  6.9753, 
3.2174, and 3.6324 for the full sample, Northeast, Midwest, South, and West, respectively. The 
models  include  the  standard  covariates  shown  in  Table  1,  and  T-Statistics  are  shown  in 




Table 9: Employment Density Models for Subgroups 
Variables  OLS  Fixed Effects  Commute Time 
No Four Year College Degree 
Raw Density  0.0017 (6.91)  0.0023 (7.10)  -0.00003 (-0.35) 
Standardized Density  0.0187  0.0253  -0.0003 
Commute Time      0.0074 (26.41) 
R-Square  0.2156  0.2633  0.2646 
Sample Size  1,415,176 
Four Year College Degree 
Raw Density  0.0030 (8.86)  0.0028 (8.63)  0.0008 (5.27) 
Standardized Density  0.0459  0.0429  0.0122 
Commute Time      0.0064 (18.46) 
R-Square  0.1750  0.2514  0.2522 
Sample Size  927,916 
Non-Hispanic White 
Raw Density  0.0030 (8.61)  0.0030 (8.21)  0.0003 (2.60) 
Standardized Density  0.0369  0.0369  0.0037 
Commute Time      0.0081 (29.99) 
R-Square  0.2473  0.2987  0.2999 
Sample Size  1,705,058 
Minority 
Raw Density  0.0011 (7.39)  0.0017 (8.31)  0.0007 (4.44) 
Standardized Density  0.0158  0.0245  0.0101 
Commute Time      0.0034 (8.06) 
R-Square  0.2859  0.3507  0.3510 
Sample Size  638,034 
Automobile Commuter 
Raw Density  0.0033 (7.34)  0.0032 (7.41)  0.0004 (3.61) 
Standardized Density  0.0224  0.0218  0.0027 
Commute Time      0.0072 (27.19) 
R-Square  0.2831  0.3281  0.3290 
,,Sample Size  2,073,487 
Mass-Transit Commuter 
Raw Density  0.0022 (7.03)  0.0016 (6.68)  0.0001 (0.54) 
Standardized Density  0.0735  0.0534  0.0033 
Commute Time      0.0069 (5.19) 
R-Square  0.4243  0.5360  0.5367 
Sample Size  144,917 
Note: All models use workplace agglomeration and commute time at the residential PUMA level 
and fixed effect models control for census tract fixed effects. The estimates in panels 1 and 2 are 
for the subsamples without and with a four year college degree, panels 3 and 4 are for the non-
Hispanic white and minority subsamples, and panels 5 and 6 are for automobile and mass-transit 
commuter  subsamples.  The  standardized  density  coefficients  are  based  on  the  within 
metropolitan  area  standard  deviation  of  the  employment  density  variable  for  each  sample   60 
 
 
measured  at  the  workplace  PUMA.  The  standard  deviations  are  11.0040,  15.3060,  12.3109, 
14.3943, 6.8012, and 33.3989 in order of the panels. The models include the standard covariates 
shown  in  Table  1,  and  T-Statistics  are  shown  in  parentheses  and  based  on  standard  errors 




Table 10: Employment Density and Workplace Human Capital Models 
Variables  OLS  Fixed Effects  Commute Time 
Baseline Model Specification 
Density  0.0015 (11.64)  0.0022 (8.55)  0.0004 (3.86) 
Share Workers with College  0.3593 (17.68)  0.1512 (10.94)  0.0472 (3.30) 
Commute Time      0.0066 (24.92) 
R-Square  0.2913  0.3340  0.3347 
No Individual Level Covariates 
Density  0.0010 (8.28)  0.0024 (8.05)  0.0003(3.18) 
Share Workers with College  0.4793 (19.66)  0.1990 (13.00)  0.0833(5.29) 
Commute Time      0.0073 (24.81) 
R-Square  0.2013  0.2895  0.2904 
Sample of Single Men 
Density  0.0012 (9.28)  0.0015 (7.17)  -0.0001 (-0.97) 
Share Workers with College  0.2596 (12.19)  0.1359(8.55)  0.0401 (2.54) 
Commute Time      0.0061 (18.03) 
R-Square  0.2431  0.3077  0.3084 
Observationally Equivalent Cells 
Density  0.0017 (11.05)  0.0024 (7.60)  0.0003 (2.20) 
Share Workers with College  0.3534(18.74)  0.1719 (9.55)  0.0597 (3.30) 
Commute Time      0.0068 (18.01) 
R-Square  0.2937  0.3563  0.3570 
Note: Panel 1 presents estimates from the baseline specification presented in Table 3 extended to 
include  a  control  for  the  share  of  workers  with  a  college  degree  at  the  workplace.  Panel  2 
presents estimates for a specification where all individual worker covariates (as listed in Table 1) 
are  excluded,  panel  3  presents  estimates  for  a  sample  of  single  men,  and  panel  4  presents 
estimates based on a model that controls for worker cell by census tract fixed effects. The first 
two and the last models use the same sample of 2,343,092 observations while the third model 
uses the subsample of single men with 617,144 observations. T-Statistics based on standard 




Table A1: Calculation of the Expectation of Parameter Estimates  












Agglomeration  1.447  1.536  1.336  0.755 
Human Capital  0.990    0.744  0.737 
Decrease Variance of Agglomeration from 0.051 to 0.010 
Agglomeration  2.010  2.210  1.759  1.705 
Human Capital  0.990    0.744  0.737 
Increase Variance of Unobserved Ability from 1.0 to 2.0 
Agglomeration  1.633  1.736  1.485  1.088 
Human Capital  0.986    0.756  0.744 
Increase Correlation between Agglomeration and Human Capital from 0.1 to 0.2 
Agglomeration  1.923  2.098  1.699  1.651 
Human Capital  0.958    0.726  0.694 
Decrease Correlation between Agglomeration and Commute time from 0.74 to 0.0 
Agglomeration  1.447  1.536  1.336  0.336 
Human Capital  0.990    0.744  0.744 
Note: The cells contain the true value of the parameter plus the calculated bias based on the 
models specified in equations (A6a-d). The baseline calculations are based on a variance of Xi 
and αi of 1, a variance of Zj of 0.051, a variance of tjk of 0.084, a correlation between Zj and (Xi + 
αi) of 0.1, a correlation between Zj and tjk of 0.74, and a correlation between (Xi + αi) and tjk of 0. 
All baseline values are preserved in following panels except for the specific variance or 
correlation being modified in the panel. In panel 3, the variance of the residential preference 
parameter increases from 3.0 to 6.5 in order to keep the attenuation of human capital variables in 




Table A2: Calculation of the Expectation of Parameter Estimates  











Correlations of Agglomeration with Human Capital at 0.040 and with Commute Time at 0.060 
Agglomeration  1.177  1.213  1.133  -0.032 
Human Capital  0.998    0.749  0.748 
Commute Time        1.175 
Decrease Correlation between Agglomeration and Commute Time to 0.029 
Agglomeration  1.177  1.213  1.133  0.136 
Human Capital  0.998    0.749  0.749 
Commute Time        0.997 
Increase Correlation between Agglomeration and Human Capital to 0.081 
Agglomeration  1.361  1.433  1.271  0.271 
Human Capital  0.993    0.746  0.746 
Commute Time        1.000 
Note: The cells contain the true value of the parameter plus the calculated bias based on the 
models specified in equations (A6a-d). The panel 1 calculations are based on a variance of Xi and 
αi of 1, a variance of Zj of 0.051, a variance of tjk of 0.084, a correlation between Zj and (Xi + αi) 
of 0.040, a correlation between Zj and tjk of 0.74, and a correlation between (Xi + αi) and tjk of 
0.060. All panel 1 values are preserved in following panels except for the specific correlation 
being modified in the panel. 
 